> For clean Markdown of any page, append .md to the page URL. > For a complete documentation index, see https://docs.nvidia.com/nemoclaw/llms.txt. > For AI client integration (Claude Code, Cursor, etc.), connect to the MCP server at https://docs.nvidia.com/nemoclaw/_mcp/server. # Understand Gateway and Secret Controls > Review runtime-specific gateway access and the shared secret-redaction and memory-scanning controls. NemoClaw applies gateway access controls when the selected agent runtime exposes an in-sandbox gateway or dashboard. CLI secret redaction and runtime-specific memory guidance apply across guide variants. ## OpenShell Gateway Authentication On Docker-driver deployments, NemoClaw gives host CLI calls and sandbox callbacks separate authenticated paths to the OpenShell gateway. | Aspect | Detail | | ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Default | NemoClaw enables local TLS, mTLS user authentication, and sandbox JWT authentication. Host-side OpenShell CLI calls use local mTLS. Sandbox callbacks use the guest mTLS bundle plus a sandbox-scoped JWT. The generated config sets `allow_unauthenticated_users = false`, and gateway launch removes an inherited `OPENSHELL_DISABLE_GATEWAY_AUTH=true`. | | Token lifetime | Local sandbox JWTs use OpenShell's `ttl_secs = 0` contract for a non-expiring token on a local single-user gateway. Sandbox identity checks and the local mTLS boundary still apply to each callback. | | What you can change | These authentication controls are not user-facing settings. Use NemoClaw to configure and start the Docker-driver gateway. | | Risk if relaxed | Disabling gateway authentication or widening the gateway listener can expose privileged gateway methods to another local or network client. | | Recommendation | Keep the OpenShell gateway on `127.0.0.1`. Use the dashboard forward when a supported agent dashboard needs remote access. | ## Gateway Compatibility Container On Linux hosts whose glibc is older than the OpenShell gateway binary requires, NemoClaw can run `openshell-gateway` in a Docker compatibility container so the Docker-driver gateway still starts. This path requires the explicit opt-in `NEMOCLAW_OPENSHELL_GATEWAY_CONTAINER_PATCH=1`. | Aspect | Detail | | ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Default | NemoClaw does not auto-enable the compatibility container on ABI mismatch. If `NEMOCLAW_OPENSHELL_GATEWAY_CONTAINER_PATCH=1` is set, the container keeps the main gateway listener on `127.0.0.1`, uses host networking so OpenShell computes the same Docker bridge callback addresses as a host-side gateway, mounts the Docker socket read-only, drops Linux capabilities, sets `no-new-privileges`, and publishes no extra Docker ports. | | What you can change | Opt in with `NEMOCLAW_OPENSHELL_GATEWAY_CONTAINER_PATCH=1`, keep the path disabled with `NEMOCLAW_OPENSHELL_GATEWAY_CONTAINER_PATCH=0`, or run on a host/OpenShell build combination where the gateway binary launches directly. | | Risk if relaxed | The Docker socket remains a privileged host API even when bind-mounted read-only. Treat this mode as equivalent to trusting the host user that can drive Docker, and do not enable it on untrusted shared hosts. | | Recommendation | Prefer a host with glibc 2.39 or newer, which OpenShell 0.0.101 supports directly, and use the compatibility container only as an explicit local bridge on an older trusted host. | OpenShell owns the native Linux glibc support floor. NemoClaw owns the explicit opt-in, host-networking configuration, read-only socket mount, and gateway authentication controls for this fallback. Remove the fallback when every supported Linux host meets OpenShell's native floor and the gateway authentication and upgrade tests pass for the release candidate without the flag. The OpenClaw gateway authenticates devices that connect to the Control UI dashboard. NemoClaw hardens these defaults at image build time. ## Device Authentication Device authentication requires each connecting device to go through a pairing flow before it can interact with the gateway. | Aspect | Detail | | ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Default | The base Dockerfile enables device authentication for loopback dashboards. Standard onboarding currently applies a managed compatibility opt-out for immediate dashboard access. NemoClaw also disables device authentication for non-loopback `CHAT_UI_URL` values. | | What you can change | Outside managed onboarding, set `NEMOCLAW_DISABLE_DEVICE_AUTH=1` only as a deliberate build-time opt-out. The setting and its managed-vs-operator provenance are baked into `openclaw.json` audit metadata and the config is verified by hash at startup. | | Risk if relaxed | Disabling device auth allows any device on the network to connect to the gateway without proving identity. This is dangerous when combined with LAN-bind changes or cloudflared tunnels in remote deployments, resulting in an unauthenticated, publicly reachable dashboard. | | Recommendation | Prefer loopback access or SSH port forwarding so device authentication stays enabled. If a browser-only remote dashboard requires the compatibility setting, use HTTPS and restrict who can reach the dashboard. | ## Gateway Bind Address NemoClaw binds the OpenShell gateway to loopback by default. | Aspect | Detail | | ------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Default | `NEMOCLAW_GATEWAY_BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1`. | | What you can change | Keep Docker-driver gateways on loopback. Set `NEMOCLAW_DASHBOARD_BIND=0.0.0.0` during onboarding and on later `connect` calls for remote dashboard/API access. Recreate a local-only sandbox before changing it to a remote bind. | | Risk if relaxed | Other hosts on the network may be able to reach the OpenShell gateway. NemoClaw rejects wildcard Docker-driver gateway binds while gateway JWT auth is active. | | Recommendation | Keep the gateway loopback default and expose only the dashboard forward when remote access is needed. | ## Insecure Auth Derivation The `allowInsecureAuth` setting controls whether the gateway permits non-HTTPS authentication. | Aspect | Detail | | ------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Default | Derived from the `CHAT_UI_URL` scheme at build time. When the URL uses `http://` (local development), insecure auth is allowed. When it uses `https://` (remote or production), insecure auth is blocked. | | What you can change | This is derived automatically from `CHAT_UI_URL`. Set `CHAT_UI_URL` to an `https://` URL to enforce secure auth. | | Risk if relaxed | Allowing insecure auth over HTTPS defeats the purpose of TLS, because authentication tokens transit in cleartext. | | Recommendation | Use `https://` for any deployment accessible beyond `localhost`. The default local URL (`http://127.0.0.1:18789`) correctly allows insecure auth for local development. | OpenClaw's security audit keeps NemoClaw-managed loopback `allowInsecureAuth` findings and provenance-known loopback device-auth opt-out findings visible as accepted findings instead of counting them as unexplained active findings. Device-auth findings record whether the opt-out came from NemoClaw's managed onboarding compatibility behavior or an operator-provided `NEMOCLAW_DISABLE_DEVICE_AUTH=1`; an opt-out with missing provenance remains active. For audit reporting, NemoClaw treats a non-loopback `CHAT_UI_URL`, an onboard-time `NEMOCLAW_DASHBOARD_BIND=0.0.0.0`, or WSL's default all-interface dashboard forward as remote dashboard exposure. For an explicit `NEMOCLAW_DASHBOARD_BIND=0.0.0.0` bind, use the same setting on later `connect` calls. If the sandbox was created without that explicit setting, NemoClaw refuses the remote forward until you recreate it with `NEMOCLAW_DASHBOARD_BIND=0.0.0.0 nemoclaw onboard --recreate-sandbox`; this keeps the generated audit state aligned with the host exposure state. On WSL, the ready summary still uses a loopback URL, but the generated audit configuration leaves the device-auth and insecure-auth findings active. For an explicit remote bind with a loopback `CHAT_UI_URL`, NemoClaw disables device auth and enables OpenClaw's Host-header origin fallback because the browser's remote origin is not known at image-build time. Both settings expand access and must remain explicit; use HTTPS or an SSH local forward when possible. In that state, NemoClaw does not add the loopback-only audit suppressions, so the resulting device-auth, insecure-auth, and Host-header fallback findings remain active. The generated configuration uses exact audit check IDs and flag details, records why each setting is present, and leaves the original severity and remediation under `suppressedFindings` in JSON output. The audit also reports that suppressions are active so you can review the accepted risk. These suppressions change audit reporting only. They do not make either flag safe, weaken enforcement, or suppress unrelated findings. Review the accepted findings and their recorded reasons: ```bash openclaw security audit --json | jq '.suppressedFindings' ``` Remove the underlying risky condition when dashboard compatibility no longer requires it. ## Auto-Pair Client Allowlist The auto-pair watcher automatically approves device pairing requests from recognized clients, so you do not need to manually approve the Control UI. | Aspect | Detail | | ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Default | Startup auto-pairing and `connect`-time approval share one policy. A lease-qualified `launch` checks current pairing state and runs the complete approval path when the stored qualification no longer matches or a relevant allowlisted request is pending. NemoClaw approves devices only when `clientId` is `cli`, `openclaw-cli`, or `openclaw-control-ui`, and only for `operator.pairing`, `operator.read`, and `operator.write` scopes. An allowlisted `clientMode` alone is never sufficient; all other clients or scopes are rejected and logged. | | What you can change | This is not a user-facing knob. The allowlist is defined by NemoClaw's OpenClaw device-approval helper. | | Risk if relaxed | Approving all device types without validation lets rogue or unexpected clients pair with the gateway unchallenged. | | Recommendation | No action needed. NemoClaw handles this automatically at startup, during `connect`, and through the complete `launch` fallback for late scope upgrades. If you see `[auto-pair] rejected unknown client=...` in the logs, investigate the source of the unexpected connection. | ### Approve Administrative Scopes Manually NemoClaw automatically approves only the `operator.pairing`, `operator.read`, and `operator.write` scopes. It never automatically approves `operator.admin`. Operations that require that scope, such as creating a cron job, need your explicit approval. From the host, open the prepared connect shell: ```bash nemoclaw connect ``` In that shell, run the administrative command once to create the pending request, and note the exact `requestId` in the failure. Then inspect the pending requests: ```bash openclaw devices list --json ``` Find that exact `requestId`, and verify that its client, device, and requested scopes match the operation you just attempted. Approve that request by its `requestId`: ```bash openclaw devices approve ``` Retry the original administrative command after the approval succeeds. Approve only the exact `requestId` emitted by your command and only the client, device, and scopes you expect. Do not approve an unexpected client or an unrelated `operator.admin` request. ## CLI Secret Redaction The CLI automatically redacts secret patterns (API keys, bearer tokens, provider credentials) from command output and error messages before logging them. | Aspect | Detail | | ------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Default | Enabled. The runner redacts secrets from stdout, stderr, and thrown error messages. | | What you can change | This is not a user-facing knob. The CLI enforces it on all command output paths. | | Risk if relaxed | Without redaction, secrets could appear in terminal scrollback, log files, or debug output shared in bug reports. | | Recommendation | No action needed. If you share NemoClaw debug output, verify that no secrets appear in the collected diagnostics. | ## Memory Secret Scanner The NemoClaw plugin blocks the agent from writing likely secrets (API keys, tokens, private keys) into persistent memory files. The scanner intercepts `Write`, `Edit`, and similar tool calls targeting memory and workspace paths before they reach disk. | Aspect | Detail | | ------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Default | Enabled. The plugin registers a `before_tool_call` hook that scans for 14 high-confidence secret patterns. | | What it covers | Three path classifiers, all enforced through `isMemoryPath()`, plus credential-shaped text such as provider API keys, OpenAI project keys with `sk-proj-` prefixes, and Slack app-level `xapp-` tokens. The path classifiers are: (1) absolute `MEMORY_PATH_SEGMENTS` such as `/.openclaw/memory/`, `/.openclaw/workspace/`, `/.openclaw/agents/`, `/.openclaw/skills/`, `/.openclaw/hooks/`, `/.openclaw/credentials/`, `/.openclaw/openclaw.json`, `/.nemoclaw/`; (2) canonical workspace basenames in `MEMORY_BASENAMES` (`IDENTITY.md`, `MEMORY.md`, `SOUL.md`, `USER.md`, `AGENTS.md`) matched regardless of the surrounding path; and (3) lexically-normalized workspace-relative writes matching `MEMORY_RELATIVE_PREFIXES` (`.openclaw/`, `.nemoclaw/`, `memory/`) or named workspace daily memory paths, for embedded-fallback mode where the host's path resolver is unavailable. | | What you can change | This is not a user-facing knob. The plugin enforces it automatically. | | Risk if relaxed | Without scanning, the agent could persist API keys or tokens in memory files that survive across sessions and backups. | | Recommendation | No action needed. If a write is blocked, the agent receives an actionable error listing the detected patterns. |