> For clean Markdown of any page, append .md to the page URL. > For a complete documentation index, see https://docs.nvidia.com/nemoclaw/llms.txt. > For AI client integration (Claude Code, Cursor, etc.), connect to the MCP server at https://docs.nvidia.com/nemoclaw/_mcp/server. # OpenClaw Security Controls Beyond NemoClaw's Scope > Documents application-layer security controls that OpenClaw provides independently, where NemoClaw adds no additional protection. NemoClaw provides infrastructure-layer security through sandbox isolation, network policy, filesystem restrictions, SSRF validation, and credential handling. It delegates all application-layer security to OpenClaw. This page documents areas where NemoClaw adds no independent protection beyond what OpenClaw already provides. The details below reflect the OpenClaw documentation at the time of writing. Consult the [OpenClaw Security docs](https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/security) for current OpenClaw behavior. ## Prompt Injection Detection and Prevention OpenClaw detects and neutralizes prompt injection attempts before they reach the agent. | Control | Detail | | ----------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Regex detection | Pattern matching detects common injection vectors such as "ignore all previous instructions" and `` tag spoofing. | | Boundary wrapping | OpenClaw wraps untrusted input in randomized XML boundary markers. | | Unicode folding | Homoglyph folding normalizes bracket variants to prevent visual spoofing. | | Invisible character stripping | OpenClaw removes zero-width invisible characters from input. | | Boundary sanitization | OpenClaw sanitizes fake boundary markers to prevent marker injection. | | Auto-wrapping | OpenClaw automatically wraps web fetch and search results as untrusted external content. | ## Tool Access Control and Policy Pipeline OpenClaw enforces a multi-layer tool policy pipeline that gates every tool call. | Control | Detail | | --------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Deny list | OpenClaw blocks high-risk tools (`exec`, `spawn`, `shell`, `fs_write`, `fs_delete`, and others) from Gateway HTTP by default. | | Policy pipeline | The multi-layer pipeline evaluates tool calls through profile, provider, agent, sandbox, and per-provider policies. | | Fail-closed semantics | Tool call hooks block execution on any error. | | Loop detection | An optional guard detects and blocks repeated identical tool call patterns. It is disabled by default and opt-in via `tools.loopDetection.enabled`. | | Plugin approval | The approval workflow defaults to deny on timeout. | ## Authentication Rate Limiting and Flood Protection OpenClaw rate-limits authentication attempts and guards against connection floods. | Control | Detail | | --------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Auth rate limiter | A sliding-window rate limiter tracks failed authentication attempts per IP and per scope. | | Control plane limiter | OpenClaw applies per-device write rate limiting for control plane operations. | | WebSocket flood guard | OpenClaw closes connections after repeated unauthorized attempts. | | Pre-auth budget | OpenClaw limits connections before authentication completes. | ## Environment Variable Security Policy OpenClaw blocks environment variables that could enable code injection, privilege escalation, or credential theft. | Category | Detail | | -------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Always-blocked keys | OpenClaw blocks keys such as `NODE_OPTIONS`, `LD_PRELOAD`, shell injection vectors, crypto mining variables, and `GIT_*` hijacking paths. | | Override-blocked keys | OpenClaw blocks additional keys unless you explicitly override them. | | Blocked prefixes | OpenClaw blocks prefixes such as `GIT_CONFIG_`, `NPM_CONFIG_`, `CARGO_REGISTRIES_`, and `TF_VAR_`. | | Universal blocked prefixes | OpenClaw blocks `DYLD_`, `LD_`, and `BASH_FUNC_`. | ## Security Audit Framework OpenClaw runs more than 50 distinct automated security checks that cover configuration, credential handling, and sandbox posture. Run `openclaw security audit` to see all findings for your deployment. The following checks run as part of the audit: * Synced-folder leak detection. * Plaintext secrets in configuration files. * Hooks hardening verification. * Gateway no-auth detection. * Sandbox misconfiguration scanning. * Weak-model susceptibility assessment. * Multi-user exposure matrix. * Node command policy validation. * Dangerous config flag scanning (`allowInsecureAuth`, `dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth`, and similar flags). ## Skill and Extension Supply Chain Scanning OpenClaw scans skills and extensions with a built-in static analysis scanner before installation. Critical findings block installation by default. The scanner checks for patterns including: * Direct process execution calls. * Dynamic code execution (`eval`, `new Function`, and similar constructs). * Cryptocurrency mining patterns. * Unexpected network activity. * Potential data exfiltration (file read combined with network calls). * Obfuscated code. * Environment variable harvesting combined with network calls. ## DM and Group Messaging Access Policy OpenClaw controls who can interact with the agent through direct messages and group channels. | Control | Detail | | ------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------------------- | | DM policy modes | OpenClaw supports four modes: open, disabled, pairing, and allowlist. | | Group policies | OpenClaw applies per-group access rules. | | Per-sender authorization | OpenClaw gates individual senders. | | Command authorization | OpenClaw applies command-level access control. | | Multi-user detection | OpenClaw uses a heuristic that detects multi-user scenarios. | ## Context Visibility and Output Controls OpenClaw restricts what supplemental context the agent can see and how it can modify outputs. | Control | Detail | | ------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Mode-based restrictions | OpenClaw limits visibility of history, threads, quotes, and forwarded messages based on the active mode. | | Sender-based restrictions | OpenClaw limits visibility based on who sent the message. | | Plugin output hooks | Plugin hooks intercept and modify tool results before they reach the user. | ## Safe Regex (ReDoS Prevention) OpenClaw includes safe regex compilation to prevent regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) attacks. The implementation detects unsafe nested quantifiers, bounds input length, and caches results. ## Next Steps * [Security Best Practices](best-practices) for NemoClaw's own security controls and risk framework. * [Credential Storage](credential-storage) for how NemoClaw stores and protects provider credentials.