

Table of contents

BIOS Configuration Schema
Example of Setting BIOS Attributes
BlueField Platform Inventory
Boot Override
Boot Order
Passing Arguments from BMC to DPU via Redfish
UefiArgs
tftp_ip
dhcpv6_uuid
hide_dpubmc_credentials
OsAras

Redfish provides a RESTful interface designed to manage IT infrastructure and is implemented using a modern toolchain (HTTP(s)/TLS/JSON).

Redfish supports the operations listed in this section.

BIOS Configuration Schema

The BIOS schema contains properties related to the BIOS attribute registry. The attribute registry describes the system-specific BIOS attributes and actions for changing to BIOS settings. It is likely that a client finds the <code>@Redfish.Settings</code> term in this resource, and if it is found, the client makes requests to change BIOS settings by modifying the resource identified by the <code>@Redfish.Settings</code> annotation.

URI	/redfish/v1/Systems/{ComputerSystemId}/Bios	
Schema file	http://redfish.dmtf.org/schemas/v1/Bios.v1_1_1.json	
Operations	GET; PATCH	

Example command and response:

```
$ curl -sku $BMC_USER:$BMC_PASSWORD -X GET
https://$BMC_IP/redfish/v1/Systems/Bluefield/Bios
{
    "@Redfish.Settings": {
        "@odata.type": "#Settings.v1_3_5.Settings",
        "SettingsObject": {
            "@odata.id": "/redfish/v1/Systems/Bluefield/Bios/Settings"
        }
    },
    "@odata.id": "/redfish/v1/Systems/Bluefield/Bios",
    "@odata.type": "#Bios.v1_2_0.Bios",
    "Actions": {
        "#Bios.ChangePassword": {
            "target":
        "/redfish/v1/Systems/Bluefield/Bios/Actions/Bios.ChangePassword"
        },
```

```
"#Bios.ResetBios": {
      "target":
"/redfish/v1/Systems/Bluefield/Bios/Actions/Bios.ResetBios"
 },
  "Attributes": {
    "BootPartitionProtection": false,
    "CeThreshold": 5000,
    "CurrentUefiPassword": "",
    "DateTime": "2024-10-17T19:47:04Z",
    "DefaultPasswordPolicy": true,
    "DisableHEST": false,
    "DisableI2c1": false,
    "DisablePCIe": false,
    "DisableSPMI": false,
    "DisableTMFF": false,
    "EmmcWipe": false,
    "Enable2ndeMMC": false,
    "EnableDdr5600": false,
    "EnableOPTEE": false,
    "EnableSMMU": true,
    "FieldMode": false,
    "ForcePxeRetryDisable": false,
    "HostPrivilegeLevel": "Restricted",
    "InternalCPUModel": "Embedded",
    "L3CachePartitionLevel": 0,
    "LegacyPasswordEnable": false,
    "NicMode": "DpuMode",
    "NvmeWipe": false,
    "OsArgs": "",
    "ResetEfiVars": false,
    "SPCR_UART": "Disabled",
    "UefiArgs": "",
    "UefiPassword": ""
  "Description": "BIOS Configuration Service",
```

```
"Id": "BIOS",
  "Links": {
    "SoftwareImages": [
        "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/UpdateService/FirmwareInventory/DPU_ATF"
        "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/UpdateService/FirmwareInventory/DPU_BOARD"
      },
        "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/UpdateService/FirmwareInventory/DPU_BSP"
        "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/UpdateService/FirmwareInventory/DPU_NIC"
      },
        "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/UpdateService/FirmwareInventory/DPU_NODE"
      },
        "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/UpdateService/FirmwareInventory/DPU_OFED"
      },
        "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/UpdateService/FirmwareInventory/DPU_OS"
      },
        "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/UpdateService/FirmwareInventory/DPU_SYS_IMAGE"
      },
```

```
"@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/UpdateService/FirmwareInventory/DPU_UEFI"
     }
     ],
     "SoftwareImages@odata.count": 9
},
     "Name": "BIOS Configuration",
     "ResetBiosToDefaultsPending": false
}
```

The following table explains each of the attributes listed in the code:

Attribute	Description
Boot Partition Protection	See description in section "System Configuration"
CurrentUefiPassword	See "Set Password" in section "System Configuration"
DateTime	See "Set RTC" in section "System Configuration"
DefaultPasswordPolicy	See "Password Settings" in section " <u>System</u> <u>Configuration</u> "
Disable PCIe	See description in section "System Configuration"
Disable SPMI	See description in section "System Configuration"
Disable TMFF	See description in section "System Configuration"
Disable HEST	See description in section "System Configuration"
EmmcWipe	See description in section "System Configuration"
Enable 2nd eMMC	See description in section "System Configuration"
Enable OP-TEE	See description in section "System Configuration"
Enable SMMU	See description in section "System Configuration"
Field Mode	See description in section "System Configuration"
Host Privilege Level	See "BlueField Modes" in section " <u>System</u> <u>Configuration</u> "

Attribute	Description
Internal CPU Model	See "BlueField Modes" in section " <u>System</u> <u>Configuration</u> "
LegacyPasswordEnable	See "Password Settings" in section " <u>System</u> <u>Configuration</u> "
NicMode	See "BlueField Modes" under section " <u>System</u> Configuration"
NvmeWipe	See description in section "System Configuration"
OsArgs	Arguments to pass to the OS kernel
ResetEfiVars	See "Reset EFI Variables" in section " <u>System</u> <u>Configuration</u> "
SPCR UART	See " Select SPCR UART " in section " <u>System</u> <u>Configuration</u> "
UefiArgs	Arguments to pass to the UEFI
[UefiPassword]	See "Set Password" in section "System Configuration"



(i) Info

To change the configuration of any of these BIOS attributes, refer to section "Changing BIOS Attributes Value" in the BMC Software User Manual.

Example of Setting BIOS Attributes

The following is an example of fetching and setting a BlueField BIOS attribute:

1. Check UEFI attributes and their values by doing a GET on Bios URI. Look for the Attributes property.

```
$ curl -sk -X GET -u $BMC_USER:$BMC_PASSWORD
https://$BMC_IP/redfish/v1/Systems/Bluefield/Bios | jq
```

```
.Attributes'
  "BootPartitionProtection": false,
  "CeThreshold": 5000,
  "CurrentUefiPassword": "",
  "DateTime": "2024-10-17T19:47:04Z",
  "DefaultPasswordPolicy": true,
  "DisableHEST": false,
  "DisableI2c1": false,
  "DisablePCIe": false,
  "DisableSPMI": false,
  "DisableTMFF": false,
  "EmmcWipe": false,
  "Enable2ndeMMC": false,
  "EnableDdr5600": false,
  "EnableOPTEE": false,
  "EnableSMMU": true,
  "FieldMode": false,
  "ForcePxeRetryDisable": false,
  "HostPrivilegeLevel": "Restricted",
  "InternalCPUModel": "Embedded",
  "L3CachePartitionLevel": 0,
  "LegacyPasswordEnable": false,
  "NicMode": "DpuMode",
  "NvmeWipe": false,
  "OsArgs": "",
  "ResetEfiVars": false,
  "SPCR_UART": "Disabled",
  "UefiArgs": "",
  "UefiPassword": ""
}
```

(i) Note

```
For Security reasons, the CurrentUefiPassword and UefiPassword strings may appear as empty.
```

2. The following example updates the UEFI password. Perform PATCH to the pending Bios settings URI as follows:

```
curl -vk -X PATCH -d '{"Attributes":{"CurrentUefiPassword":
   "$CURRENTPASSWD", "UefiPassword": "$NEWPASSWORD"}}' -u
$BMC_USER:$BMC_PASSWORD
https://<bmc_ip>/redfish/v1/Systems/SystemId/Bios/Settings |
jq '.Attributes'
```

(i) Note

To update the password, both the current password and the new password (requesting) should be specified as demonstrated above. Otherwise, the change does not work. To modify other attributes no password is required.

3. To confirm whether the PATCH request is successful, perform a GET to the pending Bios settings URI:

```
curl -vk -X GET -u -u $BMC_USER:$BMC_PASSWORD
https://<bmc_ip>/redfish/v1/Systems/SystemId/Bios/Settings |
jq '.Attributes'
```

4. For requests to take effect, reboot BlueField. If the CurrentUefiPassword is correct, then the UEFI password is updated during the UEFI Redfish phase of boot.

(i) Info

The UEFI password is only required to enter the UEFI menu using the serial console.

BlueField Platform Inventory

The NVIDIA® BlueField® networking platform (DPU or SuperNIC) provides inventory information in the ComputerSystemCollection schema. To identify the BlueField ComputerSystem instance, fetch the ComputerSystemCollection first.

BlueField devices are identified with the SystemType attribute DPU. The BlueField instance identifier value (DPU. Embedded. 1_NIC. Slot. 2 in this case) differs from one server vendor to another but will uniquely identify BlueField in all cases.

The following is a simple example of fetching Redfish inventory information from a server's BMC:

```
root@localhost:~$ python3 /usr/local/bin/redfishtool.py -r
<bmc_ip> -u <USER> -p <PASSWORD> raw GET /redfish/v1/Systems/
{
    "@odata.context":
"/redfish/v1/$metadata#ComputerSystemCollection.ComputerSystemCollection.
    "@odata.id": "/redfish/v1/Systems",
    "@odata.type":
"#ComputerSystemCollection.ComputerSystemCollection",
    "Description": "Collection of Computer Systems",
    "Members": [
        {
            "@odata.id": "/redfish/v1/Systems/System.Embedded.1"
        },
            "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/Systems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2"
```

```
}
              "Members@odata.count": 2,
              "Name": "Computer System Collection"
}
root@localhost:~$ python3 /usr/local/bin/redfishtool.py -r
<bmc_ip> -u <USER> -p <PASSWORD> raw GET
/redfish/v1/Systems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2
{
              "@odata.context":
"/redfish/v1/$metadata#ComputerSystem.ComputerSystem",
              "@odata.id": "/redfish/v1/Systems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2",
              "@odata.type": "#ComputerSystem.v1_12_0.ComputerSystem",
              "Actions": {
                            "#ComputerSystem.Reset": {
                                          "target":
"/redfish/v1/Systems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/ComputerSystems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Actions/D
                                          "ResetType@Redfish.AllowableValues": [
                                                        "ForceRestart",
                                                        "Nmi"
                            }
              },
              "Bios": {
                            "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/Systems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Bios"
              },
              "BiosVersion": null,
              "Boot": {
                            "BootOptions": {
                                          "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/Systems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/BootOptions"
                            "BootOrder": [],
                            "BootOrder@odata.count": 0,
```

```
"BootSourceOverrideEnabled": null,
        "BootSourceOverrideMode": null,
        "BootSourceOverrideTarget": null,
        "UefiTargetBootSourceOverride": null,
        "BootSourceOverrideTarget@Redfish.AllowableValues": []
    },
    "Description": "DPU System",
    "Id": "DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2",
    "Manufacturer": "DELL",
    "Model": "NVIDIA Bluefield-2 25GbE 2p Crypto DPU",
    "Name": "DPU System",
    "Oem": {
        "Dell": {
            "@odata.type":
"#DellComputerSystem.v1_1_0.DellComputerSystem",
            "DPUConfig": {
                "FQDD": "DPU.Embedded.1:NIC.Slot.2",
                "BootStatus": "OSBooting",
                "DPUBootSynchronization": "Enabled",
                "DPUTrust": "Enabled",
                "IdenticalSBDF": [
                    "0:23:0:0",
                    "0:23:0:1"
                ],
                "LastResetReason": null,
                "OSName": null,
                "OSReadyTimeout": 20,
                "OSInstallationTimeout": 30,
                "OSVersion": null,
                "OSVendor": null,
                "OSStatus": "Unknown",
                "Slot": "2",
                "PCIeSlotState": "Enabled",
```

```
"PostCode": null,
                "VendorID": "0x15B3",
                "DeviceID": "0xA2D6",
                "SubVendorID": "0x15B3",
                "SubDeviceID": "0x0129"
            },
            "Name": "DPUConfig",
            "Id": "DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2"
    },
    "PartNumber": "JNDCMX01",
    "SecureBoot": {
        "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/Systems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/SecureBoot"
    "SerialNumber": "IL740311A5000A",
    "SKU": "0JNDCM",
    "Status": {
        "Health": "Ok",
        "HealthRollup": "Ok",
        "State": "Enabled"
    },
    "SystemType": "DPU",
    "UUID": "ec6dd921-882a-ec11-8000-08c0eb5180ba",
    "@Redfish.Settings": {
        "@odata.context":
"/redfish/v1/$metadata#Settings.Settings",
        "@odata.type": "#Settings.v1_3_3.Settings",
        "SettingsObject": {
            "@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/Systems/DPU.Embedded.1_NIC.Slot.2/Settings"
    }
```

Boot Override

This example demonstrates how to boot a BlueField Platform while overriding the existing boot options and using HTTP boot to obtain the image.

Check the current boot override settings by doing a GET on ComputerSystem schema. Look for the Boot property.

```
curl -vk -X GET -u "user:password"
https://<bmc_ip>/redfish/v1/Systems/SystemId/ | python3 -m
json.tool
{
"Boot": {
        "BootNext": "",
        "BootOrderPropertySelection": "BootOrder",
        "BootSourceOverrideEnabled": "Disabled",
        "BootSourceOverrideMode": "UEFI",
        "BootSourceOverrideTarget": "None",
        "UefiTargetBootSourceOverride": "None",
        . . . . .
        },
  "BootSourceOverrideEnabled@Redfish.AllowableValues": [
             "Once",
             "Continuous",
             "Disabled"
    "BootSourceOverrideTarget@Redfish.AllowableValues": [
             "None".
             "Pxe",
             "UefiHttp",
             "UefiShell",
            "UefiTarget",
             "UefiBootNext"
        ],
```

```
}
```

The sample output above shows the BootSourceOverrideEnabled property is Disabled and BootSourceOverrideTarget is None. The BootSourceOverrideMode property should always be set to UEFI. Allowable values of BootSourceOverrideEnabled and BootSourceOverrideTarget are defined in the meta-data BootSourceOverrideEnabled@Redfish.AllowableValues and BootSourceOverrideTarget@Redfish.AllowableValues respectively.

To perform boot override, you must perform a PATCH to pending settings URI:

```
curl -vk -X PATCH -d '{"Boot":
    {"BootSourceOverrideEnabled":"Once",
    "BootSourceOverrideMode":"UEFI", "BootSourceOverrideTarget":
    "UefiHttp", "HttpBootUri":"http://<HTTP-Server-Ip>/Image.iso"}}'
-u "user:password"
    https://<bmc_ip>/redfish/v1/Systems/SystemId/Settings | python3 -
    m json.tool
```

After performing the above PATCH successfully, reboot the BlueField Platform. Once UEFI has completed, check whether the settings are applied by performing a GET on ComputerSystem schema.

Note that the HttpBootUri property is parsed by the Redfish server and the URI is presented to BlueField as part of DHCP lease when BlueField performs the HTTP boot.

```
curl -vk -X GET -u "user:password"
https://<bmc_ip>/redfish/v1/Systems/SystemId/ | python3 -m
json.tool
{
...
"Boot": {
```

```
"BootNext": "",
    "BootOrderPropertySelection": "BootOrder",
    "BootSourceOverrideEnabled": "Once",
    "BootSourceOverrideMode": "UEFI",
    "BootSourceOverrideTarget": "UefiHttp",
    "UefiTargetBootSourceOverride": "None",
    .....
},
.....
}
```

After confirming the settings are applied (see PATCH properties above), reboot BlueField for the settings to take effect. If BootSourceOverrideEnabled is set to Once, boot override is disabled and any related properties are reset to their former values to avoid repetition. If it is set to Continuous, then on every reboot, BlueField would keep performing boot override (HTTPBoot).

Boot Order

The following is an example of changing the boot order and fetching the details of a boot option.

- 1. Check the current boot order by doing GET on the ComputerSystem schema. Look for the BootOrder attribute under the Boot property.
- 2. Get the details of a particular entity in the BootOrder array by performing a GET to the respective BootOption URL. For example, to get details of Boot0006, run:

```
curl -vk -X GET -u "user:password"
https://<bmc_ip>/redfish/v1/Systems/SystemId/BootOptions/BootO
| python3 -m json.tool

{
    "@odata.type": "#BootOption.v1_0_3.BootOption",
```

```
"@odata.id":
"/redfish/v1/Systems/SystemId/BootOptions/Boot0006",
    "Id": "Boot0006",
    "BootOptionEnabled": true,
    "BootOptionReference": "Boot0006",
    "DisplayName": "UEFI HTTPv6 (MAC:B8CEF6B8A006)",
    "UefiDevicePath":
"PciRoot(0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/Pci(0x0,0x0)/
```

3. To change the boot order, the entire BootOrder array must be PATCHed to the pending settings URI. For the above example of the BootOrder array, if you intend to have Boot0006 at the beginning of the array, then the PATCH operation is as follows.

```
curl -vk -X PATCH -d '{ "Boot": { "BootOrder": [ "Boot0006",
   "Boot0017", "Boot0001", "Boot0002", "Boot0003", "Boot0004",
   "Boot0005", "Boot0007", ] }}' -u "user:password"
   https://<bmc_ip>/redfish/v1/Systems/SystemId/Settings |
   python3 -m json.tool
```

(i) Note

Updating the BootOrder array results in a permanent boot order change (persistent across reboots).

After a successful PATCH, reboot BlueField and check if the settings were applied by doing a GET on the ComputerSystem schema. If the BootOrder array is updated as intended, then the settings were applied and the BlueField Platform should boot as per the order in proceeding cycles.

Passing Arguments from BMC to DPU via Redfish

To pass arguments from BMC Redfish to UEFI and DPU OS/Kernel, there are two new attributes introduced in the BIOS Redfish schema (
redfish/v1/Systems/SYSTEM-ID/Bios/):

- UefiArgs This attribute can be used to pass arguments to UEFI from BMC Redfish
- OsArgs This attribute can be used to pass arguments to OS/Kernel from BMC Redfish

UefiArgs

This attribute is write-only and non-persistent. Meaning, user can write to this attribute (via pending setting URI) and UEFI redfish client will process it accordingly, but user can't read the current value; it is always presented as an empty string in the Bios current setting URI.

Also, the arguments passed are stored in a volatile memory in UEFI so it won't be available in the next reboot after UEFI redfish client has processed it.

Currently, user needs to provide the value of this attribute in a specific format (key=value;key2=value2). The character ';' (semi-colon) is used as a separator between different key/value pairs.

The only currently supported keys are:

- tftp_ip
- dhcpv6_duid
- hide_dpubmc_credentials

Therefore a correct value for this attribute is of the form as mentioned below. Note that it is not required to mention all the key/value pairs.

```
"UefiArgs": "tftp_ip=xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx;dhcpv6_duid=XXXX;hide_dpubmc_credentials=true"
```

Where:

- XXX.XXX.XXX is an IPv4 address.
- XXXX can be either LLT or UUID

(i) Note

The key hide_dpubmc_credentials may be set to true (default) or false.

tftp_ip

The tftp_ip key holds the IPv4 address which users intend the UEFI to use when performing PXEv4 boot instead of using the one provided by the DHCP server.

The change is persistent across reboots.

The following is an example use case for tftp_ip:

- 1. Perform PATCH UefiArgs to Bios/Settings.
- 2. Request change boot order/boot override to perform PXE boot.
- 3. Reboot BlueField for the UEFI Redfish client to process pending Redfish requests.
- 4. During PXE boot, the TFTP IP mentioned in UefiArgs is used (instead of the one mentioned in the DHCP server configuration file).

dhcpv6_uuid

The dhcpv6_uuid key can hold a Boolean value of either LLT or UUID, representing the unique identifier type used in DHCPv6 requests initiated by UEFI. This unique identifier allows for distinct system identification.

Note that the user is only setting the type of identifier, not the actual identifier value. The identifier's value is automatically generated based on the selected type, then stored and used as needed. For testing, users can use topdump to capture packets when triggering

an HTTPv6 or PXEv6 network boot in UEFI and examine the DHCPv6 request to verify the DUID type and value.

The default DUID type is UUID on BlueField platform.

hide_dpubmc_credentials

The hide_dpubmc_credentials key accepts a Boolean value (true or false, case insensitive) and defaults to false. When set to true, it hides the DPU BMC credential details from the OS.

You can verify credential visibility in the OS by checking for the following EFI variables from the DPU OS.

When this key is true, these files will not be present:

```
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/DPUBMCPassword-75a6cbf6-148c-487f-

9ffa-7dad26e15801
```

```
/sys/firmware/efi/efivars/DPUBMCUsername-75a6cbf6-148c-487f-

• 9ffa-7dad26e15801
```

Setting the value to true in Redfish takes effect after BlueField reboot. However, if changed from true to false, an additional reboot is required since the unhide operation would not apply immediately due to the Redfish runtime sequence.

This setting persists across reboots.

OsArgs

This attribute is write-only and non-persistent, with a maximum length of 8192 bytes (8 KB).



It can contain any arbitrary string, as there are no format restrictions.

The purpose of OsArgs is to pass this string to the OS/Kernel during the boot cycle. The UEFI Redfish client processes pending BIOS requests and transfers the string to the BFCF ACPI table, which the OS/Kernel can then access.

To read the BFCF ACPI table from the OS, users can use tools like acpidump (if acpica-tools is installed) or bfcfg (available here).

Example of using bfcfg:

bfcfg --dump-osarg

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