<!— SPDX-FileCopyrightText: Copyright (c) 2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved. —> <!— SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 —>

Verifying release artifacts

Every artifact a NVCRE release publishes is signed, and each one carries a statement saying which commit, workflow and tag produced it. This page is how you check that yourself.

You do not have to trust this page, the release notes, or the installer. Everything below can be run from a machine with only cosign on it, against artifacts fetched over their public URLs.

Install the CLI, verified

Start here. The README shows curl … | bash because it is short, and it is honest about what it gives you: TLS integrity in transit, and nothing at all about whether the script on the other end is the one we published. The script runs before anything has checked it.

Set TAG to the release you actually have. These commands verify the artifact TAG names and nothing else — pointed at a different release they will happily report success while telling you nothing about the file on your disk. releases/latest resolves to the newest stable release, never a pre-release.

To know what you are about to run, check it first:

TAG=v0.6.0
BASE="https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/releases/download/${TAG}"
ID="https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/.github/workflows/attest.yml@refs/tags/${TAG}"
ISSUER='https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com'
curl -fsSLO "${BASE}/installer"
curl -fsSLO "${BASE}/installer.sigstore.json"
cosign verify-blob-attestation \
  --bundle installer.sigstore.json \
  --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  installer
bash installer -v "${TAG}"

The trust anchor is the cosign you already have, not anything inside the script. That is the point: installer verifies what it installs, but it cannot verify itself, and neither can any other single-file installer.

Run the two commands back to back. Verifying a file and then executing it leaves a window in which something with write access could swap it — small, and it requires a compromise that is already worse than this, but it is a window and not a proof.

The installer also verifies the binary it downloads, refusing to install one whose bundle it cannot check, with --skip-verify as the only override. Releases up to and including v0.2.0-rc.1 ship an older installer that checks only checksums.txt (before v0.1.0-rc.9, nothing at all). v0.2.0-rc.1 is the only one of them with bundles, so it is the only one whose installer you can verify as above; releases before it carry no bundles and cannot be verified this way.

Prerequisites

cosign is the only one that is strictly required. Pin the version you use: the bundle format is governed by the cosign version that produced it, and the release pipeline pins v3.1.3 for exactly that reason.

The identity contract

Every attestation in a NVCRE release is produced by one reusable workflow, so there is exactly one identity to pin:

--certificate-identity   https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/.github/workflows/attest.yml@refs/tags/<TAG>
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com

Use --certificate-identity. Do not use --certificate-identity-regexp.

This is not style. An identity that names no workflow and no ref also accepts builds from branches, and this project publishes main-<sha> development images. A pattern like https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine accepts those too — so a command built on it reports success for an artifact that was never released. The exact form names the workflow and the tag, so a signature from v0.1.0 cannot pass as v0.2.0, and a branch build cannot pass as either.

Build Level, and why the pin matters

Provenance is SLSA Build L2 per artifact today — the manager image index, the Helm chart, each nvcrectl binary, installer, THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md, and the standalone nvcrectl-*.cyclonedx.json SBOM release assets alike. The project does not publish a single project-wide level, and it does not claim L3: builder isolation is still missing (the build runs in the caller — for images, inside build-image.yml invoked by the top-level orchestrator; attest.yml attests a digest it is handed). What L2 here does claim is that provenance origin fields are unforgeable by that build process — Fulcio names attest.yml, origin fields come from trusted GITHUB_* context inside that workflow, and a guard refuses to list attest.yml as the builder.

The same-repo reusable-workflow form (uses: ./.github/workflows/attest.yml) isolates attestation from the caller’s build steps, not from write access to the repository. For main (dev-image) pushes the practical control is branch protection over attest.yml; for the release identity pinned above, it is tag protection / repository rulesets over v* tags.

Pinning the identity above is the check that makes the level observable. Drop the --certificate-identity flag (or replace it with a loose regexp) and verification can still go green while proving less than Build L2: you no longer know the attestation was minted inside the reusable workflow. The published commands keep the exact pin. The gate-test enumeration that backs this claim lives in SECURITY.md (kept in one place so renaming a test cannot leave two pages asserting enforcement by a name that no longer exists); this page links rather than duplicates it.

Verifying the container image

The image is a multi-platform index. Two different things are attested, to two different subjects, and the distinction matters:

An SBOM describes the contents of one root filesystem, and an index has more than one. A single SBOM attached to the index would be silently wrong for whichever platform it did not describe, so each platform gets its own.

Signature and provenance, against the tag:

TAG=v0.6.0
IMAGE=ghcr.io/nvidia/cluster-readiness-engine/manager
ID="https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/.github/workflows/attest.yml@refs/tags/${TAG}"
ISSUER='https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com'
cosign verify \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${IMAGE}:${TAG}"
cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance1 \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${IMAGE}:${TAG}"

The SBOM lives on the platform manifest, so resolve that digest first rather than reusing the tag:

AMD64="$(crane digest --platform linux/amd64 "${IMAGE}:${TAG}")"
echo "linux/amd64 -> ${AMD64}"
cosign verify-attestation --type cyclonedx \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${IMAGE}@${AMD64}"

What the provenance actually proves

A signature says who signed and under which ref. Only the provenance predicate says what was built. Read it:

set -o pipefail
STATEMENT="$(cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance1 \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${IMAGE}:${TAG}" 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.payload' | head -1 | base64 -d)"
# An empty STATEMENT means verification failed, not that there is nothing to say.
# Without this the jq below prints nothing and exits 0.
[[ -n "${STATEMENT}" ]] || { echo "provenance verification failed" >&2; exit 1; }
jq -r '{
  repository: .predicate.buildDefinition.externalParameters.repository,
  ref:        .predicate.buildDefinition.externalParameters.ref,
  commit:     .predicate.buildDefinition.resolvedDependencies[0].digest.gitCommit,
  builder:    .predicate.runDetails.builder.id
}' <<<"${STATEMENT}"

Confirm the commit is the one the tag points at:

git ls-remote --exit-code https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine "refs/tags/${TAG}^{}"

The ^{} is required and easy to miss. Release tags here are signed, so refs/tags/<TAG> resolves to the tag object, not the commit — comparing that against the provenance would mismatch on every correct release. ^{} peels it to the commit the provenance actually names. --exit-code makes a tag that does not exist fail rather than print nothing and succeed.

head -1 above is deliberate, and it is also why the git ls-remote check is not optional. A retried signing attempt can leave more than one valid attestation on a digest — expected, and not tampering — so .payload can return several lines, and feeding all of them to base64 -d produces nonsense. Taking the first is what makes the command runnable; comparing the commit it reports against the tag is what makes taking the first safe. Do both, or loop over every line and require each statement to agree before trusting any of them.

Verifying the Helm chart before installing it

Verify the digest, then install that digest — not the tag you verified a moment ago:

CHART=ghcr.io/nvidia/cluster-readiness-engine
DIGEST="$(crane digest "${CHART}:${TAG}")"
cosign verify \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${CHART}@${DIGEST}"
cosign verify-attestation --type slsaprovenance1 \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${CHART}@${DIGEST}"
helm pull "oci://${CHART}@${DIGEST}"

Pulling by digest is what makes the download match what you verified: content addressing means you receive those exact bytes or an error.

Then install the file you pulled, not the tag:

IMAGE_DIGEST="$(crane digest "${IMAGE}:${TAG}")"
helm install nvcre ./cluster-readiness-engine*.tgz \
  --namespace nvcre --create-namespace \
  --set manager.image.digest="${IMAGE_DIGEST}"

Two things there are doing work.

Installing from the local .tgz rather than oci://…/cluster-readiness-engine --version <tag> matters because the second form re-resolves the tag at install time, which throws away everything you just checked.

manager.image.digest matters for the same reason one level down. The chart otherwise deploys manager:<tag>, and a tag can be repointed after you verified it. Setting the digest pins the image to the bytes whose signature you checked. Leave it unset and you get the tag, which is fine for a development cluster and not what you did this work for.

Verifying a downloaded binary and its SBOM

Each nvcrectl-* binary ships three bundles whose names differ by one segment, and they prove different things:

The middle one is the one people miss. It binds the SBOM to the binary, so a real SBOM for a different build cannot be presented alongside this one.

ASSET=nvcrectl-linux-amd64
curl -fsSLO "${BASE}/${ASSET}"
curl -fsSLO "${BASE}/${ASSET}.sigstore.json"
curl -fsSLO "${BASE}/${ASSET}.cyclonedx.json"
curl -fsSLO "${BASE}/${ASSET}.cyclonedx.sigstore.json"
curl -fsSLO "${BASE}/${ASSET}.cyclonedx.json.sigstore.json"
# 1. the binary is from this release
cosign verify-blob-attestation \
  --bundle "${ASSET}.sigstore.json" \
  --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${ASSET}"
# 2. the SBOM beside it describes that binary -- note the subject is the BINARY
cosign verify-blob-attestation \
  --bundle "${ASSET}.cyclonedx.sigstore.json" \
  --type cyclonedx \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${ASSET}"
# 3. the SBOM FILE on your disk has not been altered -- subject is the FILE
cosign verify-blob-attestation \
  --bundle "${ASSET}.cyclonedx.json.sigstore.json" \
  --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${ASSET}.cyclonedx.json"

Step 3 is the one that is easy to skip and the one that protects the file you are about to read. Steps 1 and 2 both take the binary as their subject, so neither of them looks at ${ASSET}.cyclonedx.json at all: replace that file with a doctored SBOM and both still report Verified OK. Only step 3 fails, with provided artifact digests do not match digests in statement.

Reading the SBOM

Read it only after step 3 above. The SBOM is published as a plain asset, so no extraction is needed for binaries:

jq -r '.metadata.component.name, (.components | length)' "${ASSET}.cyclonedx.json"

For the image, the SBOM is inside an attestation and has to be extracted. Write it through a temporary file:

set -o pipefail
tmp="$(mktemp)"
cosign verify-attestation --type cyclonedx \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${IMAGE}@${AMD64}" 2>/dev/null \
  | jq -r '.payload' | head -1 | base64 -d | jq '.predicate' > "${tmp}"
mv "${tmp}" sbom-linux-amd64.json
jq -r '.components | length' sbom-linux-amd64.json

Do not write straight to the final path. > truncates the target before the pipeline runs and jq exits 0 on empty input, so a failed verification leaves a zero-length file and a zero exit status — a broken result that reads as success.

The mv is a separate statement on purpose. Chaining it with && would put the pipeline on the left of an &&, where set -e does not apply, so the failure would not abort there either. Written as two statements, set -euo pipefail aborts on the pipeline itself.

Air-gapped verification

cosign verify needs the Sigstore trust root. Copying ~/.sigstore across is not enough: cosign v3.1.3 attempts a TUF refresh on every verification and fails with tuf refresh failed: ... connection refused rather than falling back to that cache. It fails closed, which is the right direction, but it does not verify.

Export the trust root as a file instead, on a machine with network:

cosign initialize
cp ~/.sigstore/root/tuf-repo-cdn.sigstore.dev/targets/trusted_root.json .

Move trusted_root.json across with the artifacts, and pass it explicitly. That path takes no network at all:

cosign verify-blob-attestation \
  --trusted-root ./trusted_root.json \
  --bundle "${ASSET}.sigstore.json" \
  --type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 \
  --certificate-identity "${ID}" \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer "${ISSUER}" \
  "${ASSET}"

--trusted-root works on every cosign verify* command. The bundle already carries the signature, the certificate and the inclusion proof, so with the trust root on disk there is nothing left to fetch.

Refresh trusted_root.json periodically. It pins the Sigstore keys, and a stale copy will eventually reject signatures made with newer ones.

Blob bundles are the easy case: an asset and its .sigstore.json are two files, and cosign verify-blob-attestation reads both from disk. Registry attestations need the registry, so mirror the image and chart with crane copy before disconnecting.

Mirroring the bytes is half the job. The cluster still has to pull from the mirror, so point the chart at it — see Air-gapped and disconnected environments for the manager.image.repository override. Verifying artifacts and then deploying a reference the cluster cannot reach leaves you with a correct signature and a pod that never starts.

Enforcing this automatically

Everything above is something a person runs. Tools that sync from the registry — Flux OCIRepository, Argo CD, Argo CD Image Updater — do not wait for the GitHub Release, so the release gate does not protect them; they see the image and chart as soon as those are pushed. They are the consumers who most need the identity contract enforced declaratively rather than typed.

Flux supports this natively with spec.verify using the cosign provider, matching the same OIDC issuer and identity used above. Whether that path works end to end against a real Flux version is still being confirmed (issue #267), so this page does not yet publish a manifest for it — an untested verification config is exactly the kind of false assurance the rest of this page exists to avoid.

Admission-policy samples

Samples under config/samples/policy/ pin the same issuer and attest.yml@refs/tags/<TAG> identity as the commands above, and they expect the new-bundle / OCI referrer layout ADR-074 publishes (not a legacy sha256-<digest>.sig tag).

Both samples require a signature and SLSA Build Provenance v1 on the image index digest, matching the two cosign commands in Verifying the container image. A per-platform child manifest is signed and carries a CycloneDX SBOM but not provenance (emit_provenance: false on those legs); pin the index digest in Helm with manager.image.digest, as above.

Apply runbook

1. Edit the pinned tag in the sample so subject: names the release you run. Nothing in CI rewrites that string when a new tag ships. Applying a pin that does not match the image already in the cluster will deny the next upgrade, rollout restart, node drain, or crash-loop replacement until you edit the policy.

2. If you mirrored the controller image off ghcr.io (see deployment.md), rewrite every image glob in the sample (matchImageReferences for Kyverno, images[].glob for policy-controller) to your mirror repository path before applying. Kyverno fails open when no glob matches (images.* becomes [] and [].all(...) is true); policy-controller chart-default no-match-policy: deny fails closed on unmatched images — either way a stale ghcr.io/... glob does not protect the mirrored manager image you meant to admit.

3. Label the namespace that runs the controller (default nvcre) so enforcement is opt-in, not cluster-wide:

   # Kyverno sample (matchConstraints.namespaceSelector)
   kubectl label namespace nvcre \
     kubernetes.nvcre.nvidia.com/image-admission=enforce
   # policy-controller sample (chart-default opt-in). Labelling puts the whole
   # namespace under deny-by-default for images that match no ClusterImagePolicy
   # unless you set no-match-policy to allow|warn.
   kubectl label namespace nvcre policy.sigstore.dev/include=true

4. Apply the sample that matches the admission controller you already run:

   kubectl apply -f config/samples/policy/kyverno-verify-images.yaml
   # or
   kubectl apply -f config/samples/policy/policy-controller-verify-images.yaml

Why the samples look the way they do

These constraints are load-bearing; a first attempt that skipped them was parked (issue #272) because it would break an operator’s cluster.

Kind reproduction (operator / maintainer)

This environment may not have Docker or Kind. On a machine that does, the intended check is server-side dry-run so the admission webhook actually runs:

TAG=v0.6.0
IMAGE=ghcr.io/nvidia/cluster-readiness-engine/manager
DIGEST="$(crane digest "${IMAGE}:${TAG}")"
ID="https://github.com/NVIDIA/cluster-readiness-engine/.github/workflows/attest.yml@refs/tags/${TAG}"
# Live main-<sha7> tag from GHCR (publish.yml does not publish a floating :main).
# GHCR lists tags oldest-first, so `crane ls | grep '^main-' | head -n1` returns
# an unsigned early build. publish.yml computes the tag as main-${GITHUB_SHA::7}:
#   DEV_TAG="main-$(git rev-parse --short=7 origin/main)"
DEV_TAG=main-c2d4d47
# --- Kyverno path (primary for issue #272) ---
kubectl create namespace nvcre --dry-run=client -o yaml | kubectl apply -f -
kubectl label namespace nvcre \
  kubernetes.nvcre.nvidia.com/image-admission=enforce --overwrite
# Edit the sample's subject pin to ${TAG}, then:
kubectl apply -f config/samples/policy/kyverno-verify-images.yaml
# Admitted: signed release index by digest
kubectl run nvcre-admit --image="${IMAGE}@${DIGEST}" -n nvcre \
  --dry-run=server --restart=Never -o name
# Denied: signed under attest.yml@refs/heads/main (development image).
# Uses a real published main-<sha7> tag so admission resolves the manifest and
# exercises the subject: identity pin (a floating :main tag is not published).
kubectl run nvcre-deny-main --image="${IMAGE}:${DEV_TAG}" -n nvcre \
  --dry-run=server --restart=Never -o name
# Denied: published but unsigned. Pre-dates release signing, which starts at
# v0.1.0-rc.9, so admission resolves the manifest and fails on missing
# signature material rather than on the lookup. (These old tags could be GC'd;
# a 404 then is obvious. :not-a-release is a lookup failure, not this criterion.)
kubectl run nvcre-deny-unsigned --image="${IMAGE}:v0.1.0-rc.1" -n nvcre \
  --dry-run=server --restart=Never -o name
# Untouched on Kyverno: image outside matchImageReferences, even in the labeled
# namespace (validations never see it).
kubectl run nvcre-other --image="busybox:1.36" -n nvcre \
  --dry-run=server --restart=Never -o name
# --- policy-controller caveat ---
# If you apply the policy-controller sample instead, labelling with
# policy.sigstore.dev/include=true puts the namespace under chart-default
# no-match-policy=deny. The busybox create above is then DENIED (not untouched)
# because busybox matches no ClusterImagePolicy. Untouched only holds if
# no-match-policy is allow|warn, or the namespace is unlabeled. Prefer a
# separate namespace for that check, and treat the policy-controller sample
# as format guidance until the #272 re-test lands.

These repro steps are fenced as shell rather than bash so Docs Verify (which extracts and runs every bash block on this page) does not try them without a cluster. CI does not reproduce live admission: it needs a cluster and registry access. Structural tests under test/docspolicy pin the kind, validationActions: [Deny], fail-closed failurePolicy, issuer, identity prefix (and anchored repository path), single attestor / authority, namespace selector, provenance attestation, narrow globs, and signatureFormat: bundle so the samples cannot silently rot into the parked shape.

Troubleshooting

no matching CertificateIdentity found — the identity did not match. The message prints the SAN it expected and the SAN it found; compare them. The usual cause is a TAG that does not match the artifact, since the identity embeds the tag.

none of the attestations matched the predicate type: <type>, found: <types> — right identity and subject, wrong --type. Provenance is slsaprovenance1 on the index digest; an SBOM is cyclonedx on a per-platform digest. The message lists what the subject actually carries, which tells you which of the two you got wrong.

reading <file>: no such file or directory — the bundle is not on disk. Usually the curl for it failed: releases before v0.2.0-rc.1 carry no bundles at all, so curl -fsSLO .../installer.sigstore.json returns curl: (56) ... error 404 and cosign never runs. Nothing was signed there; there is nothing to verify.

exec: "docker-credential-osxkeychain" from helm pull — a local Docker credential helper is declared in ~/.docker/config.json but not installed. It has nothing to do with the chart, which is public and needs no credentials. Point helm at an empty registry config to bypass it:

echo '{}' > /tmp/helm-reg.json
HELM_REGISTRY_CONFIG=/tmp/helm-reg.json helm pull "oci://${CHART}@${DIGEST}"

Verification fails intermittently — Rekor and the registry are network services. cosign has no retry flag; run the command again before concluding anything. A transient failure and a real mismatch produce different messages, and the first one is far more common.

A checksum passed but you want more — checksums.txt is served from the same origin as the assets and is itself unsigned, so whoever can replace an asset can replace its checksum line in the same write. It detects corruption, not tampering. This is not theoretical: a release built with a binary deliberately modified after signing produced ok checksums.txt and was caught only by the signature check. Verify the bundle.

See also

• SECURITY.md — reporting policy and the supply chain summary
• RELEASE.md — what a release publishes and how it verifies itself
• ADR-074 — the artifact and verification contract, and why each choice was made