Access Control
The OpenShell gateway supports these access-control models for human callers on Kubernetes:
The Helm chart generates a gateway TLS certificate and a user client certificate at install time. Supervisor Pods project only ca.crt from the client Secret so they can authenticate the gateway; the client certificate and private key are not exposed to sandboxes. Supervisors authenticate their RPCs with gateway-minted sandbox JWTs.
For how the CLI resolves gateways and stores credentials, refer to Gateway Authentication.
Sandbox Supervisor Identity
Kubernetes sandbox supervisors authenticate back to the gateway as sandbox workloads. By default, the Kubernetes compute driver validates each projected ServiceAccount token and returns the authenticated sandbox ID plus a stable runtime identity to the gateway. The gateway requires that identity to match the namespace, immutable Sandbox resource UID, and supervisor Pod UID recorded during provisioning before it mints its own sandbox JWT.
Dynamic provider token grants can use SPIFFE without changing supervisor-to-gateway authentication. Set gatewayConfig.openshell.drivers.kubernetes.provider_spiffe_workload_api_socket_path to mount the SPIFFE CSI Workload API socket into gateway and sandbox pods while keeping the projected ServiceAccount token bootstrap and gateway-minted sandbox JWT path.
Provider token grants require a SPIFFE implementation such as SPIRE and identities for the gateway and sandbox pods. The repository’s local SPIRE overlay assigns sandbox IDs from the pod’s openshell.ai/sandbox-id annotation, but the gateway validation path only requires the supervisor SVID to be valid and in the same SPIFFE trust domain as the gateway SVID. Provider profiles with token_grant metadata cause the sandbox supervisor to request JWT-SVIDs and exchange them for upstream OAuth2 access tokens. Token-exchange profiles also require a gateway SPIFFE identity because the gateway brokers the intermediate token exchange with its own JWT-SVID.
The gateway verifies supervisor JWT-SVIDs with JWT bundles fetched from the SPIFFE Workload API, so intermediate token exchange does not require gateway access to the SPIRE OIDC discovery endpoint or its TLS CA.
OIDC User Authentication
Set gatewayConfig.openshell.gateway.oidc.issuer to enable OIDC. The gateway validates the Authorization: Bearer <token> header on every request against the issuer’s JWKS endpoint. It accepts JWTs signed with RS256, RS384, RS512, PS256, PS384, PS512, ES256, ES384, or EdDSA (Ed25519) keys published in the issuer JWKS. Okta tenants that sign access tokens with ES256 work without additional gateway configuration.
Client certificates are optional at the TLS handshake, so OIDC callers can connect without them. Set server.tls.clientCaSecretName="" to disable client-certificate verification entirely. The chart omits client_ca_path from gateway.toml and does not mount the client-CA volume, leaving HTTPS-only transport with OIDC for user authentication. Do not set the value to null; omit the key to use the chart default, or set it to "" to disable client certificate verification.
The audience value must match the client ID configured in your identity provider for the OpenShell resource server.
OIDC values reference
The issuer must use HTTPS. The gateway rejects discovery and JWKS redirects,
limits response sizes, requires a JSON media type, and rejects a jwks_uri on
a different origin unless that origin appears in jwks_allowed_origins. Use
server.oidc.caConfigMapName for issuers signed by a private CA.
Auth-only mode vs. RBAC mode
Leave both admin_role and user_role empty to use auth-only mode: any request with a valid JWT from the configured issuer is accepted, but no role distinction is enforced.
Set both values to enable RBAC mode, where the gateway checks the role claim and enforces access based on the assigned role:
Both admin_role and user_role must be set, or both must be empty. Setting only one is not supported.
OIDC RBAC is method-level authorization. It controls which API operations a caller can perform, but provider and sandbox records are not owned by individual OIDC subjects. In shared clusters, treat provider credentials as gateway-wide resources and use separate gateways or external tenancy controls when users must not see or attach each other’s providers and sandboxes.
Provider-specific rolesClaim paths
Reverse-Proxy Auth Termination
When an access proxy, such as Cloudflare Access, ngrok, or a corporate SSO gateway, terminates TLS and handles authentication in front of the OpenShell gateway, configure the gateway for plaintext traffic from that trusted proxy and explicitly allow unauthenticated user calls:
The gateway listens on plaintext HTTP behind the trusted proxy, while sandbox supervisors still authenticate with gateway-minted sandbox JWTs. User-facing CLI/API calls without OIDC or mTLS credentials are accepted as an unauthenticated local developer principal. The proxy is responsible for authenticating callers and forwarding only authorized traffic.
Only enable unauthenticated users when the gateway is not reachable from outside a trusted local development environment or the proxy path is fully trusted. Never expose a plaintext, auth-disabled gateway to a public network.
Register the gateway with the CLI using the proxy’s public URL. The browser-based login flow runs automatically on first use: