Secure Agent Workspace
Secure Agent Workspace is a Capability Reference Design that adds a governed environment for persistent and autonomous agent work. A user endpoint attaches to the workspace, while identity, network access, credentials, runtime policy, audit, and human review constrain execution outside the model trust boundary.
The published Building secure agent workspaces with NVIDIA OpenShell Reference Architecture describes an OpenShell-based composition of this capability. Use this page to understand the capability’s relationship to the core. Refer to the published architecture for detailed design and implementation guidance.
Inference is a dependency, not part of the workspace boundary. A workspace can consume a routed model endpoint or local inference without turning the inference service into a workspace component.
Relationship to the Core
Secure Agent Workspace extends the core layers as follows:
Architecture
NVIDIA OpenShell is an implementation option for runtime-bounded agent execution. It provides sandbox lifecycle, policy controls, credential mediation, network controls, and multiple compute drivers. OpenShell does not replace the selected container sandbox, microVM, VM, cluster network policy, or enterprise governance boundary.
NVIDIA Open Agent Safety Platform is related guidance for full-stack agent governance and continuous monitoring. Secure Agent Workspace composes workspace lifecycle, identity, isolation, network, credential, and audit requirements; Open Agent Safety Platform does not replace that workspace boundary. Review the technical architecture overview and OpenShell Developer Guide when selecting implementation controls.
Secure Agent Workspace requires an approved agent isolation boundary. A raw pod, container, or shared host process without a policy-approved sandbox runtime or VM boundary does not satisfy this capability.
Required Interfaces and Dependencies
- Enterprise identity and accountable user or sponsor.
- Workspace identity, lifecycle state, and attachment controls.
- Logical agent registration and per-engagement delegated authority.
- Short-lived, runtime-bound credentials for individual tool actions.
- Routed inference or explicitly governed local inference.
- A policy-approved isolation class, such as a microVM-backed Kata Containers runtime or a dedicated VM provided through KubeVirt or OpenShift Virtualization.
- Default-deny network policy, controlled ingress, and policy-routed egress through an egress gateway or equivalent enforcement point.
- Auditable connectors to enterprise data and actions.
- Fleet health, security operations, incident containment, and decommissioning.
Security and Governance Boundary
Keep user, workspace, logical-agent, runtime-agent, and tool-call identities distinct. Bind each action to the sponsoring user and the policy state that authorized it. Prompt instructions are not a substitute for enforceable runtime, credential, and network controls.
Non-Goals
- An enterprise identity provider.
- A universal inference service.
- A replacement for endpoint security or source-system authorization.
- One prescribed cloud, hypervisor, Kubernetes distribution, or agent framework.
Deployment Patterns
Select a deployment pattern that satisfies the workload’s isolation, operations, and acceleration requirements:
The selected runtime class, hypervisor, host configuration, device exposure, and attestation model must be supported and approved for the applicable risk tier. Naming a runtime alone does not establish the required isolation boundary.
Operations
Operate workspace images, state, policy, credentials, identity bindings, network access, connectors, audit, capacity, backup, incident containment, revocation, and secure decommissioning as one lifecycle.
Published Reference Implementations
Implementation links describe specific partner-platform patterns. Their inclusion does not make either platform the universal architecture.
Primary Source
Building secure agent workspaces with NVIDIA OpenShell Reference Architecture