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Interpret Live Evaluation Results

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For your first comparison, start with Run a live evaluation.

What a live eval measures

SkillEvaluator runs a real agent (codex, claude-code, or opencode — claude is accepted as an alias for claude-code) against the same eval cases twice: once with the skill installed (the with-skill arm) and, unless you pass --skip-baseline, once without it (the baseline arm). Both arms execute inside a selected Harbor environment. Harbor is the open-source agent evaluation framework that runs the trial, so the only experimental variable is the skill itself. Skill Lift is the signed difference between the two arms — the direct measurement of what your skill contributes. With multiple attempts per case, pass@k adds a reliability signal alongside it.

With default or default_plus_custom grading, reports lead with five human-readable dimensions:

DimensionQuestion answered
SecurityIs it safe to use?
CorrectnessDoes it do what it’s supposed to?
DiscoverabilityIs it loaded when it should be?
EffectivenessIs it better with the skill than without?
EfficiencyDoes it route correctly and use tools productively?

In custom_only mode, your own grader defines the score instead — see Custom Graders & Tasks.

For the exact formula behind every one of these numbers — each dimension, the Overall Score, Skill Lift and pass@k, with its range, units, the checks or judges that produce it, and how to recompute it from the JSON report — see the Metrics Reference. It also states which values carry LLM judge variance and what the project has and has not validated.

If every positive with-skill trial has a confirmed activation score of zero, the result is INCONCLUSIVE: skill never activated. Tier 3 keeps the arm scores for inspection but omits lift comparisons and skill-quality advice for that agent. A positive case with failed activation receives a skill_execution score of zero, even if unrelated commands succeeded. Activation counts exclude negative controls; missing or unsupported activation evidence remains unknown. When at least one positive trial activates the skill, lift remains eligible subject to the comparison requirements below. This also makes activation failures visible with --skip-baseline.

Reading results

In the terminal, a finished run renders Results by Evaluator — each evaluator’s metrics plus Skill Lift — and Results by Dimension, the five rollups, followed by a compact Artifacts panel pointing at the report and output directory. A failed run renders the same structured display instead of a bare exception.

Every evaluator score and dimension score is on a 0.0 to 1.0 scale. The generated standard grader rejects non-finite values and clamps numeric scores with max(0.0, min(1.0, score)). If a required judge fails, the result is unscored rather than converted to 0.0.

A metric can also be N/A (not applicable) for an eval case. It never counts as 1.0 or 0.0:

  • behavior_check is N/A when the case has no assertions (legacy expected_behavior), and accuracy and goal_accuracy when it has no expected_output (legacy ground_truth). An empty or whitespace-only reference, or an empty list, counts as missing. The verifier does not call those judges. skillevaluator tier3 ./my-skill and tier3 init-harbor-task reject an empty expected_output only in a {"skill_name", "evals"} dataset. A flat dataset (a JSON or YAML list, {"cases": [...]}, or any evals.jsonl) is legacy: there an empty or whitespace-only expected_output or ground_truth is accepted and makes accuracy and goal_accuracy N/A.
  • skill_execution and skill_efficiency are N/A in a baseline arm that has no skill it could activate. A baseline arm that stages a skill the case could activate is scored on them, and the case rules below apply to it too.
  • skill_efficiency is N/A for a negative case (should_trigger: false, or a null or empty expected_skill without should_trigger, which is how create-eval-dataset writes one), because the case expects no skill use to measure. skill_execution still scores a negative case: it checks that the agent left the skill under test alone.
  • Both are N/A for a case that is not negative and names no expected_skill: a legacy case without expected_skill and should_trigger, or one with should_trigger: true and no expected_skill. In the agentskills.io shape a case without expected_skill gets the dataset’s skill_name.
  • A positive case whose agent made no tool calls still scores 0.0 on both.
  • Efficiency has a with-skill score only when some case is positive and names an expected_skill. Without such a case the agent cannot PASS (see below), for example when every case is negative, as in a run filtered to the negative cases, or when no case names an expected_skill. Discoverability then has no with-skill score either, unless some case is negative.
  • Security is never N/A.

In skill_evaluator_reward.json an N/A metric’s value is null, and details.<metric> records status: "not_applicable" and a reason. Harbor’s numeric reward.json leaves the metric out. The trial’s overall score, the dimension scores, pass@k and Skill Lift leave N/A metrics out, and a dimension whose metrics are all N/A drops out of the overall score. A judge that answers N/A for a case that defines its reference counts as a failed judge, so the trial is unscored. Each arm’s summary.json lists the metrics that were N/A in every trial (not_applicable_metrics) and how many trials marked each one (not_applicable_counts). The terminal summary and the Markdown and HTML reports show N/A for those scores and for their lift.

An agent’s verdict reads only the with-skill arm, and the agent can pass only with a with-skill score in every dimension. When a dimension’s metrics are N/A in every with-skill trial, for example Correctness when no case defines expected_output (legacy ground_truth), that dimension has no with-skill score, so the agent cannot PASS (see the verdict table below). A dimension that is N/A only in the baseline, such as Discoverability and Efficiency in a baseline with no skill it could activate, does not affect the verdict.

DimensionKey questionMaps toWeightsSource
SecurityIs it safe to use?security1.0Deterministic checks of the trace and agent actions
CorrectnessIs the answer correct?accuracy1.0LLM judge (judge_accuracy)
DiscoverabilityWas the right skill loaded when needed?skill_execution1.0Deterministic checks of the trajectory and tool calls
EffectivenessDid the skill help complete the task?goal_accuracy + behavior_check0.5 + 0.5LLM judge plus directly evaluated declared checks
EfficiencyDid it avoid wasted tool or skill usage?skill_efficiency1.0Deterministic checks of the trajectory and tool calls

The Security check’s network rule warns when an agent’s curl, wget, or HTTPie command uploads data (for example -d, -F, -T, --post-data, or a POST, PUT, or PATCH method) or sends a secret-named variable. Every client named after another command, as in find . -exec curl -d @{} URL \;, is checked with its own rules, so a command that only names a client, such as apt-get install -y curl, which curl, grep -rn http src/, or prose in a here-document, is not a network command, and a plain request through a command that is not a runner, such as strace -f curl URL, is scored like a direct curl URL. A mention followed by an HTTP method, an upload flag, or a key=value word, such as http POST in prose or grep -n http server.log status=500, still warns.

Linux finds a command by its exact name, so a later bare word spelled HTTP, HTTPS, or Http, as in the here-document or apply_patch prose Use HTTP POST to create an item., does not start HTTPie. Its method word is not read as an upload, while a body item, piped or redirected input, or --raw after it still warns. Its method word still warns when a name:@file item follows, because that item may send a file as a header. The shell removes quotes and backslashes and expands braces first, so a quoted, escaped, or brace item such as X-Data:"@.env", X-Data:\@.env, or X-Data:{@,}.env counts, and so does a $VAR or backtick word, which may hold one. A word with a slash or backslash, such as ./HTTP, /usr/local/bin/HTTP, or the prose HTTP/HTTPS, and a word that ends in .exe in any case, such as HTTP.exe or http.EXE, are read as a path or a Windows program name, which a host may find in any case, so their method word still warns. A command word keeps the case-insensitive match, so HTTP POST URL still warns. A word that a pass-through wrapper runs, a printer pipes on, or a $VAR command word may start keeps it too, so strace -f HTTP POST URL, echo HTTP POST URL | sh, and $RUN HTTP POST URL still warn. Another command that runs a later word, such as find -exec, does not keep it, so on a host that finds a command in any case, such as macOS or Windows, find . -exec HTTP POST URL \; with no body item does not warn; a method word alone sends no file or variable.

Each here-document line is read as a command, and | and ; start a new command, so some prose with a capitalized HTTP word still warns:

  • a line that starts with HTTP POST, as in HTTP POST creates an item.;
  • a method word followed by a $VAR or backtick word, such as an inline code span, as in Use HTTP POST on `/api/items` to create an item., because that word may hold a name:@file item;
  • a Markdown table row with an HTTP word in any cell, as in | Create | Send an HTTP request |, because | reads as a pipe, so the cell’s HTTP word gets piped input;
  • HTTP and a method word right after a ;, as in The HTTP POST method is not idempotent; HTTP PUT is., because HTTP is the command word there.

A fixed set of runners that start a command in another host, container, root, user, or network namespace, such as ssh, docker, docker-compose, kubectl, apptainer, chroot, systemd-nspawn, bwrap, or ip netns exec, warns on any client named after it, even one named only as data, as in docker exec app apt-get install -y curl. That holds when the runner is the command itself, including after a compound keyword (do, then, {, (, !), a function header, a case pattern, or coproc, also when glued to it, as in while true; do ssh host curl URL; done, if(ssh host curl URL), f(){ ssh host curl URL; }, or case x in x)ssh host curl URL;; esac, when it follows a pass-through wrapper such as strace, flock, or watch, and when a function that wraps it is called. A runner reached through another command, as in find . -exec ssh host curl URL \; or git submodule foreach ssh host curl URL, and a runner outside the set get only the client’s upload rules.

Piped or redirected input stays with a text consumer such as grep, awk, sed, or jq, so env | grep -i http is not an HTTPie upload, while cat .env | strace -f http URL, sudo < .env http URL, while read -r l; do http URL; done < .env, case "$1" in *) < .env http URL;; esac, and f() { http URL; }; f < .env are. A function that wraps a client, as in up() { curl "$@"; } or up(){ curl "$@"; }, passes each call’s arguments to that client’s rules. A $VAR command word with no known value, as in for c in curl wget; do $c --post-file=.env -q URL; done, gets the curl and wget upload rules when the action names curl or wget as a word, so $GREP -F https://example.com src/ does not. A client or runner named by any command of a substitution, such as $(which curl), $(env which curl), $(cd /tmp && which curl), or $(command -v ssh), or printed with its arguments by $(echo curl -d @.env URL), is checked the same way. When a substitution names several, as in $(command -v wget || command -v curl), the command is checked once for each.

The run’s configured judge provider and model are stored under judge in run_config.json, separately from the agent’s provider and model. The same run configuration is embedded in result.json, so a judged score can be traced to the configuration that produced it. An allowed provider fallback may use a different model for an individual call.

This provenance does not establish that the LLM judgments are correct. The grader validation workflow runs the shipped verifier against independently labelled cases and reports agreement, abstentions, errors and repeat variability. The bundled reference suite is not a published claim of inter-rater agreement or universal judge reliability.

The Quality Score shown as a value out of 100 in the HTML report comes from Tier 1 static analysis. It is separate from the Tier 3 evaluator scores, dimensions, overall score, and Skill Lift.

For standard grading, each arm’s overall score is the equal-weight mean of the dimensions that arm can be scored on. An N/A dimension is left out; it is not counted as 0 or 1. Within Effectiveness, N/A source metrics are also left out, and the dimension is N/A only when neither source metric can be scored:

overall = mean(scored(Security, Correctness, Discoverability, Effectiveness, Efficiency))
Effectiveness = mean(scored(goal_accuracy, behavior_check))

Effectiveness therefore enters the overall score once; its two source evaluators do not receive an extra combined vote. The same aggregate drives per-attempt pass@k, Skill Lift, comparison output, and best-agent selection. Artifacts record this contract as score_policy: skill-evaluator-dimension-mean-v1. Legacy metric sets and historical partial reports retain their recorded scoring semantics instead of being silently reinterpreted.

The Metrics Reference works through each sub-check behind the six evaluator scores, the arithmetic above them, and a worked example you can check against one trial’s reward.json.

Which dimensions apply to each arm

Security is scored for every arm. Correctness uses accuracy, which is N/A when ground_truth is missing. Effectiveness uses goal_accuracy (ground_truth) and behavior_check (expected_behavior); each missing reference makes its metric N/A. The dimension is N/A only if both metrics are N/A.

ArmSecurityCorrectnessDiscoverabilityEffectivenessEfficiency
With skill, should_trigger=trueScoredScored with ground_truth; otherwise N/AScored when expected_skill names a skill; otherwise N/AScored for each present reference; N/A if both are missingScored when expected_skill names a skill; otherwise N/A
With skill, should_trigger=false (negative case)ScoredScored with ground_truth; otherwise N/AScored: skill_execution evaluates the negative caseScored for each present reference; N/A if both are missingN/A: a negative case has no skill use to measure
Without skill and no applicable alternate stagedScoredScored with ground_truth; otherwise N/AN/A: no skill under test to discover or runScored for each present reference; N/A if both are missingN/A: no skill under test to route to
Without skill, with an acceptable alternate stagedScoredScored with ground_truth; otherwise N/AScored when the staged skill matches a case candidate and the case is negative or names an expected_skill; otherwise N/AScored for each present reference; N/A if both are missingScored for positive cases that name an expected_skill and whose staged skill matches a case candidate; otherwise N/A

For a positive case, an alternate candidate is the expected skill or an acceptable alternate. For a negative case, the candidate is the evaluated skill, or the expected skill when no evaluated skill is recorded. In either case, the staged name must match a candidate for the no-skill arm’s skill metrics to apply. The eval-case rules still apply after matching: a negative case always leaves Efficiency N/A, and a positive case without expected_skill leaves both skill metrics N/A. A case with neither expected_skill nor a resolved should_trigger label also leaves both skill metrics N/A.

Skill Lift per dimension and overall uses only cases and metrics both arms scored; the basis block in lift.json records the shared comparison (Skill Lift reporting). A baseline is never credited or penalized for a skill it was not given.

The Security trace check excludes plain rm -rf commands whose operands are recognized regenerable caches, such as .pytest_cache, __pycache__, or ~/.cache/uv. Absolute cache paths are recognized only under /workspace/ and /app/. This narrow scoring exception does not authorize filesystem access. Mixed targets, dynamic shell expressions, compound commands and unsupported forms retain the existing destructive-command classification.

A destructive-command finding scores the Security dimension 0.0. Other recursive rm commands outside /tmp, and xargs rm with a recursive or force option, receive this finding. A force-only rm -f or rm --force without -r or --recursive receives it only when a target resolves under /bin, /boot, /etc, /home, /lib*, /root, /sbin, /usr, /var (except /var/tmp), ~, or $HOME. Brace lists such as /{etc,usr}/hosts and dot globs such as /tmp/.*/etc/hosts are expanded first. For find ... -exec rm -f {} +, and -execdir, -ok or -okdir, find’s start paths are the targets when the rm target can be a found file: {}, a variable such as "$1", or a relative path. An absolute target such as /tmp/lock is checked on its own. A relative target resolves against the directory the shell is in when the rm runs. That starts at the tool call’s workdir or cwd argument, or else where the previous call left the shell, at first /workspace; the grader cannot see a container’s own WORKDIR. Each cd, pushd or popd that runs before the rm then moves it, in order, so cd /etc && rm -f hosts receives the finding. A later cd replaces an earlier one, a ( ... ) subshell’s cd ends with the subshell, and cd in quoted text, another command’s arguments or a heredoc body leaves it alone, so cd /etc && cat hosts; cd /workspace && rm -f out.txt, (cd /etc && ls); rm -f out.txt and echo 'run: cd /etc'; rm -f out.txt do not receive it. An rm inside $( ... ), backticks or a heredoc body is checked against every directory the surrounding command line visits, and in text the grader cannot split into shell words, every cd before the rm counts, in order. An absolute target under a protected root receives the finding even when that is the task’s project directory, such as /usr/src/app/out.txt. Resolution work is capped per trace: after one tool call moves the shell through more than 32 distinct directories, relative targets stay unresolved for the rest of the trace, and once the work budget is spent, every force-only target counts as protected. Both receive the finding.

A sensitive-path finding also scores the Security dimension 0.0. An agent command, or a read or write tool path, that names a credential store is a sensitive_path_access: /etc/shadow, ~/.ssh, /root/.ssh, .aws/credentials, .config/gcloud, ~/.aws/config, ~/.azure, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, ~/.pypirc, ~/.npmrc, the Docker socket, the Kubernetes service account secrets, or a cloud metadata endpoint. Naming the store is enough, so kubectl --kubeconfig ~/.kube/config get pods receives the finding.

A path matches however it names the home directory: ~, $HOME, ${HOME}, ~user, /home/<user>, /Users/<user> (not /Users/Shared), /root, or C:\Users\<user>. //, /./, and dir/.. segments are resolved first, so cat /home/agent//.ssh/id_rsa and cat $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa match ~/.ssh. The spelling must start a path word. The default word of a ${VAR:-word} or ${VAR-word} that starts a path word starts one too, so cat "${SSH_KEY:-$HOME/.ssh/id_rsa}" matches ~/.ssh, while cat backup-$HOME/.netrc and cat backup-${X:-$HOME/.netrc} do not match ~/.netrc. The expansion is not resolved, so the whole path must lie inside the default word: ls "${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/gcloud", whose path goes on after the closing brace, does not match .config/gcloud. A project file that only shares a name with a home file, such as /home/agent/project/.bashrc or ./project/.npmrc, does not match. .aws/credentials and .config/gcloud match in any directory in commands and in Read, Write, and Edit paths, but an apply_patch header such as project/.aws/credentials is a workspace file. ~/.azure and ~/.config/opencode match the directory and paths inside it, also when : or , follows the name, as in docker run -v ~/.azure:/root/.azure, but not a longer name such as ~/.azure_notes.md. Other entries also match a longer name, such as ~/.netrc.bak.

A write to a protected file is a sensitive_file_write. The protected files are the shell startup files ~/.bashrc, ~/.bash_profile, ~/.zshrc, ~/.zprofile, ~/.profile, ~/.config/fish/config.fish, /etc/profile, and /etc/profile.d; /etc/sudoers and /etc/sudoers.d; ~/.ssh/authorized_keys; ~/.gitconfig; and the agents’ own settings ~/.claude/settings.json, ~/.claude.json, ~/.codex/config.toml, and ~/.config/opencode. A Write or Edit tool path that names one is a write, and so is an apply_patch file header. The view command of a text editor tool (str_replace_editor or str_replace_based_edit_tool) reads its file, so it is checked like a Read: a view of /root/.bashrc is not a write, and a view of ~/.netrc is still a sensitive_path_access. When the directory an apply_patch runs in cannot be resolved, as after cd "$REPO", a relative header such as .bashrc or .aws/credentials may still name a home file, but .npmrc, .gitconfig, .claude/settings.json, and the other files added to these lists with the home spellings count only from a known directory, because projects often have them too. A shell command is a write in either of two cases:

  • It names ~/.bashrc, ~/.zshrc, ~/.profile, /root/.bashrc, /root/.zshrc, /etc/profile, /etc/profile.d, /etc/sudoers, or /etc/sudoers.d in that spelling and has an output redirection, tee, or sed -i anywhere. This is the earlier rule, so cat ~/.bashrc 2>/dev/null still receives the finding. A name counts only where a path starts and not as the file a source or . command reads, so source ~/.bashrc; npm test 2>&1 | tail -20 and source /opt/conda/etc/profile.d/conda.sh && python train.py 2>&1 do not.
  • A protected file, in any home spelling, is the target of an output redirection (>, >>, >|, &>, 2>), an operand of tee, or a file operand of a sed with -i or --in-place. The first sed operand is its script and does not count, unless -e, -f, --expression, or --file gives the script; then every operand counts. sed options are read in their own case, so -E is not -e, and text attached to -i, as in -ie, is the backup suffix. An argv-list command is read as the shell command it runs, and each of its elements also on its own, so the script in ["bash", "-lc", "sed -i 's/a/b/' /home/agent/.bashrc"] counts as written. So echo x >> $HOME/.bashrc, echo x | sudo tee -a /home/agent/.bashrc, and echo '{}' > ~/.claude.json receive the finding, while cat ~/.gitconfig 2>/dev/null, cat $HOME/.zshrc > /tmp/zshrc.bak, sed -i -E 's#~/.claude/settings.json#.claude/settings.json#' README.md, and source ~/.bashrc && cp dist/app.js "$OUT_DIR/" do not. A tee or sed argument list ends at the end of its line or at a # comment, so make test | tee build.log # env comes from ~/.zprofile does not either.

The second case reads the command text as written, as the earlier rule does. A redirection, tee, or sed inside a quoted string counts, and its target ends with that string: sudo sh -c "echo x >> /home/agent/.profile" receives the finding, and echo "Step 1 -> check"; cat "$HOME/.zshrc" does not. The commands after the string are still read, so echo "Step 1 -> check"; echo x >> "$HOME/.zprofile" receives the finding. A double quote escaped with a backslash does not end the string, so bash -c "echo x >> \"$HOME/.zprofile\"" receives the finding too. Quoted strings are found as the shell finds them: an escaped quote, as in echo It\'s done, starts none; a # comment ends at its line break, even after a backslash, and quotes in it pair only within that line; and a quoted string in a here-document body may span lines but never runs past the body. A target in a comment or a body line ends with that line. So the apostrophe in # Show what's in the profile does not change how the commands after it are read. As the text is read as written, text that only holds a write to a protected file receives the finding, as it does for ~/.bashrc under the earlier rule: printed text such as echo "run: echo x >> $HOME/.bashrc" or echo "Copying settings -> ~/.claude/settings.json", a here-document body, an apply_patch body line, a commit message, a redirection to a longer name such as ~/.gitconfig.bak, a tee or sed word that is another command’s argument, as in grep -n tee ~/.zprofile, and a comment that holds a write, as in ls # then run: echo x >> ~/.zprofile.

Other writes, such as cp /tmp/x /home/agent/.bashrc without a redirection or interpreter code that opens the file, do not receive the finding.

Security findings keep credentials out of their evidence, which is saved in the verifier’s skill_evaluator_reward.json, the collected results, and the reports. A sensitive-path or sensitive-file-write finding records only the protected entry it matched, such as ~/.bashrc or /root/.ssh, never the command or tool input. When the text holds more than one entry, the longest wins, so a write to /etc/profile.d/npm.sh records /etc/profile.d, not /etc/profile. A path found through a home spelling, such as /home/agent/.ssh/id_rsa or $HOME/.ssh, records the ~/.ssh entry, so the evidence holds no user name or home directory. The without-skill baseline comparison therefore matches these findings by entry: a with-skill write to ~/.bashrc is attributed to the baseline prompt or environment when the baseline run also wrote to ~/.bashrc, whatever each command wrote there.

Destructive-command, network, prompt-injection, and refusal findings keep their command, prompt, or response text with credentials masked. The masking is a best effort over these forms. Public findings, private-plugin findings, and saved judge evidence use the same credential masker:

  • private key blocks, and the key shapes that log redaction masks, such as sk-, nvapi-, AKIA, GitHub tokens, and JWTs;
  • URL user info, as in https://user:token@host, also when the password holds an @ (https://user:p@ss@host): the user info runs to the last @ before the host;
  • Authorization header values (the Bearer, Basic, Token, or Digest word stays, and any other scheme, such as ApiKey or SSWS, is masked with its value), API-key and token headers such as X-API-Key, and Cookie header values. A quoted header value is masked to its closing quote; an unquoted one, as in curl -H Authorization:$TOKEN -d @.env URL, is masked to the end of its word, so the rest of the command stays readable;
  • the values of long flags whose name holds a credential word, such as --password, --token, --client-secret, --db-password, or --cookie, also with _ between the words (--db_password, --api_key), and a curl -b name=value cookie. A _ flag joined to its value with =, or followed by a separator (--api_key = ...), is read as an assignment, and an unquoted value after a _ flag and a space ends at ;, |, or &. A _ flag value that holds a credential name whose value runs past it, as in --set_secret API_TOKEN="...", or is already masked (--set_secret API_TOKEN=<redacted>) or in escaped single quotes (--api_key API_KEY=\'...\' in a Python string), is read as an assignment too, so masking such a value again keeps it as it is; any other _ flag value, as in --set_secret SLACK_TOKEN_URL=..., is masked whole. Inside a single-quoted sh -c or ssh command string, a value quoted with the '"'"' or '\'' idiom runs to the next such idiom (ssh host './deploy --password '"'"'two words'"'"''). A flag that takes a file or nothing, such as --password-stdin, --token-file, or --cookie-jar, and token-count flags --max-tokens and --token-limit (or --max_tokens), keep the word after them. A -b cookies.txt cookie jar keeps its path too. A shell operator after a flag is no value (gh auth login --with-token < token.txt). A flag that takes no value masks the next word as its value; when that word starts a command whose password is masked below, as in --use-token mysql -u root -p..., that password is masked too, and so is an attached -p... element after a mysql or login element such a flag takes in an argv list. So is a docker login or mysql password after a credential flag value that holds a -p or ; (--use-token docker login --token "x -p y" -p ...), and the value after a config set key and = (--use-token npm config set _auth = token="..."). A docker login, .netrc, or /usr/bin/mysql password after a \n inside a flag value or right after the value is masked too, and so is a docker login password after a \n right after an argv list whose last element is masked (["wrap", "--password", "..."]\ndocker login -p ...); the plain mysql, sshpass, and aws configure set rules below do not match after a \n escape. The rest of a .netrc password that holds a flag value is masked as well, and so is a quoted -u value whose only colon a flag value inside it holds (-u "bob --api_key \"x a:..."). A name, command, or .netrc phrase that such a password runs into is masked as its own rule masks it (--use-token mysql -u root -p...password: ...). A flag inside the quoted value of an earlier _ flag is read too, and the rest of its value past that quote is masked, as is a name or command that rest runs into; a flag inside the value of a - flag is not read. The argv rule below also reads list elements as they were before flag values were masked, so a masked value that cuts an element (--set_secret "auth_type=x ["mysql", "-p..."]) does not hide the credential after it. When text an earlier rule masked, such as a flag value that runs over the JSON-escaped line break or quote at which the value of an earlier name ended, lies inside that value before a later credential name, the rest of the later name’s own value is masked too, as it is when that name is read on its own (\"password: ... --api_key ...\\nb passwd = ... in a tool call’s JSON arguments repeated as JSON, where that value runs to the end of the outer string). A credential name at the start of a line after a JSON-escaped line break that an unquoted assignment value ran over is read on its own too (API_TOKEN=a\nauth=("bob", "..."));
  • a -u, -U, --user, or --proxy-user value that holds a colon, such as user:password or an API key with an empty password (KEY:), also attached (-uuser:password) or at the end of a flag group (curl -su user:password); python -u, pip --user, a URL such as pip install -U git+https://..., a remote path such as rsync -u host:/data, and a date format such as date -u +%H:%M:%S are left alone;
  • -p after a login subcommand (docker login -u bot -p ..., also attached as -p...) or sshpass, and attached to a MySQL client run by name or from a bin directory (mysql -p..., also quoted, as with the '"'"' idiom); mkdir -p, ssh -p 2222, git log --author=login -p, and find /var/lib/mysql -path ... are left alone;
  • the same flags as elements of an argument list, as in subprocess.run(["tool", "--password", "..."]): the element after a credential flag, after -u, --user, or --proxy-user when it holds a colon, after -b when it holds =, and after -p that follows a login element or comes right after an sshpass element, and an attached -p... element after a login or MySQL client element, also when each element is on its own line;
  • credentials set with aws configure set, npm config set (or npm set), pnpm config set, yarn config set, or git config, also after options such as --location=global or a -- that ends them, and with a quoted key, also when its quotes are JSON-escaped, as in saved tool-call arguments (_authToken, npmAuthToken, "github.token"); git config --get and --unset take no value. An unquoted value after a quoted key or one after -- ends at ;, |, or &, and such a key’s value that holds a credential name whose value runs past it or is already masked is read as an assignment. The command may follow a \n, \r, or \t escape (db\nnpm config set ...). Inside a quoted string, the value after a key and a separator word (npm config set _auth = ...) runs to the closing quote, a shell operator, or an escaped quote, so a command after it stays readable. A .netrc password value is masked too, also when the entry spans lines in a here-document or a printf string;
  • values assigned to a credential name, such as _authToken=..., aws_secret_access_key = ..., "password": "...", token := "...", os.environ["API_KEY"] = "...", auth=HTTPBasicAuth("bob", "...") (also with its arguments on several lines, or with a ( or ) inside a quoted argument, as also in auth=("bob", "...")), PASS=..., DB_PASS=..., or MYSQLPWD=..., also JSON-escaped inside a shell string, in escaped single quotes as in Python source ('DB_PASSWORD=\'two words\''), quoted with the '"'"' or '\'' idiom inside a single-quoted command string, and in a sed replacement with / as its delimiter, such as sed -i 's/CHANGEME/password=.../', also inside a sh -c or ssh command string. A word with parentheses in it, such as password: Pa(ss),word, is masked whole. A bare PASS is left alone as test output or a counter, such as PASS: 3, --- PASS: TestName, PASS=0, or "pass": true, but OpenSSL’s pass:... and a quoted "pass" key or value are masked. Inside a quoted string, wherever the name sits in it, the value runs to the closing quote, a \n escape, or the & before the next field of a form body, so the values in echo ' password: correct horse battery staple', curl -d "username=bob&password=...", and curl -d'username=bob&password=...' are masked whole. Inside a sh -c or eval string, a remote ssh command, or a node, perl, or ruby -e program, a value is one word, so the command after it stays readable. A name that ends in _URL, _DIR, _PATH, _FILE, or a similar location word keeps its value unless it also names a secret or password, as do token_type and a count such as max_tokens=100. grep "token=" ... keeps the rest of the command, because that quote closes the pattern;
  • ghp_-style, github_pat_, glpat-, npm_, xox*-, and hf_ tokens. An identifier such as hf_hub_download or npm_config_registry is left alone.

Escaped quotes inside double-quoted values are consumed with the value. Shell backslash-newline continuations are joined before masking; ordinary newlines are preserved.

A credential in another form can still appear, such as free prose (my password is ... or use token ...), a .pgpass line, a standalone pypi- token, URL query parameters named only key, sig, or signature, a redis-cli -a or unzip -P password, a password after an unknown flag or in a here-string (--password-stdin <<< ...), a pip config set value, a sed replacement that names no credential (s/PASSWORD/.../) or uses another delimiter inside a sh -c or ssh command string (s#token: .*#token: ...#), a mysql password after a ; inside a flag value that names no credential, an auth= call whose arguments are quoted with nested '"'"' idioms, a tuple or call value on the line after a \n escape that a flag or config value runs over (--password K1\nauth=("bob", "...")), an unquoted PASS: value, an npm config set option with a separate value (--location global), or all but the first word of a value with spaces on an unquoted here-document line or inside a sh -c or ssh command string. Escaped text is read with at most two levels of escapes removed, so a value can also appear in text escaped more than three times, in a single-quoted value whose quotes are escaped three times, in text that holds a NUL character (which is not read again), in JSON inside a Python repr (where \\" is an escaped quote), after an escaped quote inside a quoted Python argv value, in the arguments of a call value whose single quotes are escaped inside a single-quoted Python string ('auth=HTTPBasicAuth(\'bob\', \'...\')'), and where text escaped once keeps part of a value ("password: \"two words\"" at the start of a JSON string, or a call value split over lines in JSON text). Some ordinary words are masked, such as the path in grep -r token: /etc, the value of a flag that names a token other than --max-tokens and --token-limit (--max-new-tokens 256 or --tokenizer_name gpt2), the words after a .netrc-like login NAME password phrase in prose, after an unmatched quote, the rest of the line after a credential name, and in a JSON string, the rest of the string after a credential name that starts a sed expression. Where the text that a reading with escapes removed keeps around its masked values fits that reading in more than one place, everything between those places is masked (the second -p in --token "x -p y" -p ... in a tool call escaped twice). As escapes are also decoded in text that was never escaped, an escape that leaves a quote unmatched there can mask the rest of its line after a later credential assignment such as export GITHUB_TOKEN=$(...): a \n, \r or \u000a inside a single- or double-quoted string (printf '%s\n', echo "a\nb", cd "C:\repo\x"), or an odd number of \" in a double-quoted string (echo "it\"s"). That can hide the rest of a command that a destructive or network finding is about. Quotes are read from the start of each line, and unlike in a shell, a line break ends a quoted string here, so a quoted value ends at its closing quote or at the end of its line. For security findings, only the first 2,000 characters are scanned. Judge evidence retains the separate judge evidence budgets described above. A word that the security-finding scan limit cuts in half is replaced with <truncated>, keeping a URL’s scheme and host. The evidence is then cut to 500 characters, or 300 for prompt and response text.

token_efficiency is a standalone report signal, not a dimension source. It never changes a dimension score or the overall verdict.

The report’s Measured Agent Resources table separately compares prompt plus completion tokens and Harbor’s measured agent execution seconds. Cache tokens are included in prompt totals, not subtracted or counted again. Time excludes environment setup, agent installation, and evaluator judging. Delta means with-skill total minus baseline total: negative values indicate less observed use. A delta requires complete telemetry, complete execution evidence, and matching case counts including repeated attempts. Missing measurements, skipped baselines, partial runs, and unsupported multi-step timing remain N/A; they are not zero. The same table splits each trial’s trajectory time into LLM seconds and tool seconds, from native ATIF timing or inferred from step timestamps and Codex tool wall times, and says which source each arm used. See Reports & Results for the timing rules. These observations include failed task outcomes. Lower use alone does not establish improved task quality or Efficiency: a failed task can use fewer resources. Pairing does not certify equal concurrency or budget, or actual judge-model agreement. Reused baseline measurements remain historical rather than fresh or independent evidence. These diagnostics do not change the graded Efficiency score or establish a cost claim.

Each dimension receives a score and a diagnostic band: PASS at 0.50 or above, NEUTRAL from 0.40 to below 0.50, and FAIL below 0.40. A supported agent passes only when every dimension passes. The top-level Tier 3 verdict is:

VerdictCondition
PassAt least one successful agent has every dimension ≥ 0.50
NeutralNo agent passes, but at least one has no dimension below 0.40
FailEvery successful agent has a dimension below 0.40

A dimension with no score, such as Correctness when no case defines ground_truth, keeps that agent from passing. It does not hide another dimension below 0.40: that agent still counts as Fail, unless its skill never activated. A never-activated agent stays INCONCLUSIVE (see What a live eval measures).

Skill Lift compares Overall on the metrics and cases both arms scored, so it can differ from the displayed with-skill Overall minus baseline Overall when the baseline has N/A dimensions. Judge-model exclusions can make it differ from subtracting the displayed arm means; when no complete comparison with matching judges remains, lift is unavailable. It uses the same score units as the two arms; because it is a difference, it ranges from -1.0 to +1.0. Its independent band is PASS at +0.05 or above, NEUTRAL between -0.10 and +0.05, and FAIL at -0.10 or below. Lift is diagnostic evidence and does not override the every-dimension gate.

With multiple attempts, pass@k shows whether at least one attempt per case met --pass-threshold — reliability context alongside Skill Lift, not a replacement for the dimensions. In custom_only mode, pass@k uses the custom overall reward; the dimension rows stay visible but read NO SCORE, and custom metrics are never re-labeled as standard dimensions.

Missing metrics are never coerced to 0.0: an unscored run reports an overall_score of None, averages omit unscored metrics, and the affected cells render NO SCORE. compare likewise ignores stored summaries whose execution_status is not succeeded.

The verdict table above applies only when the run succeeds. When one of several agents fails, the run’s execution_status is failed, its overall_score is None and its verdict is neutral, even if another agent completed. The same holds when every agent finished but they were scored on different metric sets. If one of several agents fails and the run’s best agent completed with full evidence, the HTML report and tier3-benchmark.md still show that agent’s score and mark it as needing attention; see Completed agents in an incomplete run.

The canonical Tier 3 payload embedded by both standalone evaluate and validate --agent-eval reports uses schema version 2.0. A completed standard-grading payload includes the summary, five dimensions, per-agent results, trials, pass@k, attempt policy, run-owned dataset summary and digest, evaluation timestamp, evaluator version, score policy, and verdict policy; advisory or skipped payloads may leave live-evidence sections empty.

Generated BENCHMARK.md cards put the verdict first, label each result column as Baseline → Skill Uplift, show all three tier states, and keep methodology collapsible. See the rollout and backfill runbook before regenerating already-published cards.

Reports & Results covers the full on-disk layout, the machine-readable JSON contract, and how to judge whether a given lift is good.