SecuritySecurity Controls

Understand Filesystem Controls

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NemoClaw restricts which paths the agent can read and write, protecting system binaries, configuration files, and gateway credentials.

OpenShell covers additional filesystem enforcement details, including hard_requirement compatibility mode for Landlock and policy path validation rules. Refer to the Filesystem Controls section of the OpenShell Security Best Practices.

Read-Only System Paths

The container mounts system directories read-only to prevent the agent from modifying binaries, libraries, or configuration files.

AspectDetail
Default/usr, /lib, /proc, /dev/urandom, /app, /etc, /var/log, and /var/lib/dpkg are read-only.
What you can changeAdd or remove paths in the filesystem_policy.read_only section of the policy file.
Risk if relaxedMaking /usr or /lib writable lets the agent replace system binaries (such as curl or node) with trojanized versions. Making /etc writable lets the agent modify DNS resolution, TLS trust stores, or user accounts.
RecommendationNever make system paths writable. If the agent needs a writable location for generated files, use a subdirectory of /sandbox.

Agent Config Directory

The /sandbox/.hermes directory contains Hermes runtime configuration, generated environment settings, logs, platform state, and durable database state. NemoClaw writes config.yaml and .env during onboarding and rebuilds. Direct edits to these files can be overwritten when NemoClaw regenerates the image.

Hermes also stores runtime state such as state.db, logs, and platform sessions under the .hermes tree. Messaging sessions such as WhatsApp pairing can remain mutable by design so they survive rebuilds.

For plan-aware current images, the Shields workflow derives the Hermes lock plan from its agent manifest. Historical Hermes images that have a bundled helper but no generated plan use the helper’s reviewed legacy inventory until the sandbox is rebuilt.

It locks cron, hooks, platforms, plugins, profiles, skills, skins, weixin, and workspace to root:sandbox. The profiles/dashboard-home carve-out remains sandbox:sandbox 0700, and the guard does not traverse or rewrite its descendants. It locks the pairing confidentiality root to root:sandbox 0710. Hermes runtime directories without a Shields declaration remain mutable.

The shared state-directory guard applies the manifest declaration to pairing on current Hermes images. On historical images, the reviewed legacy inventory also treats present credentials and identity directories as confidentiality roots.

The guard sets the root to root:sandbox 0710, keeps it traversable but unlistable to the sandbox group, and sets every descendant to root:root with no group or world permission bits. As a result, a known-name probe for a missing direct child returns ENOENT, while directory listing, nested traversal, and protected-file reads return EACCES.

AspectDetail
DefaultThe Hermes config tree contains NemoClaw-generated config plus mutable runtime state.
What you can changeUse host-side NemoClaw commands for durable model, provider, messaging, and policy changes; inspect files directly only for debugging.
Risk of direct editsDirect edits to generated config can drift from the host registry and may be lost on rebuild.
RecommendationFor sensitive workloads, keep generated config under NemoClaw control and back up Hermes state before destructive operations.

Writable Paths

The agent has read-write access to /sandbox, /tmp, /dev/null, and /dev/pts.

AspectDetail
Default/sandbox (agent workspace), /tmp (temporary files), /dev/null, and /dev/pts (the devpts pseudo-terminal directory, required so PTY-based tools such as tmux, script, and interactive shells can allocate a terminal).
What you can changeAdd additional writable paths in filesystem_policy.read_write.
Risk if relaxedEach additional writable path expands the agent’s ability to persist data and potentially modify system behavior. Adding /var lets the agent write to log directories. Adding /home gives access to other user directories.
RecommendationKeep writable paths to /sandbox and /tmp. If the agent needs a persistent working directory, create a subdirectory under /sandbox.

Landlock LSM Enforcement

Landlock is a Linux Security Module that enforces filesystem access rules at the kernel level.

AspectDetail
Defaultcompatibility: best_effort. The entrypoint applies Landlock rules when the kernel supports them and silently skips them on older kernels.
What you can changeThis is a NemoClaw default, not a user-facing knob.
Risk if relaxedOn kernels without Landlock support (pre-5.13), filesystem restrictions rely solely on container mount configuration, which is less granular.
RecommendationRun on a kernel that supports Landlock (5.13+). Ubuntu 22.04 LTS and later include Landlock support.