Secure Deployment Recipe#

This recipe describes a minimal network-segmentation pattern for deploying VSS when users, services, or networks outside a trusted administrative boundary may be present. It complements the current security constraints documented in Known Limitations.

Deployment Scope#

VSS is intended to run inside a trusted, isolated network. Do not expose the Agent UI, Agent API, MCP servers, NIM endpoints, databases, brokers, or VIOS/VST APIs directly to the public internet or to untrusted users. Provide external authentication, TLS, rate limiting, and monitoring at the infrastructure layer.

Reference Segmentation Pattern#

Use a network boundary such as a VPN, private subnet, security group, or authenticated reverse proxy in front of VSS:

Network path

Allow

Block

Trusted browser clients to edge proxy or VPN

HTTPS access from approved user or administrator CIDRs

Direct access from the public internet

Edge proxy or VPN to VSS host

TCP 7777 for the VSS UI ingress

Direct access to Agent API, MCP, NIM, database, broker, and VIOS/VST ports

VSS host to internal services

Required container, Docker bridge, or private-subnet traffic between VSS services

Traffic from untrusted networks to internal service ports

Administrator workstation to VSS host

SSH or management access from approved administrator CIDRs

Broad management access from general user networks

Example Firewall Intent#

For a single-host developer-profile deployment, the firewall policy should read like this:

  • Allow TCP 7777 only from trusted browser-client CIDRs or from the reverse proxy.

  • Allow SSH only from administrator CIDRs.

  • Keep service ports such as Agent API 8000, VA-MCP 9901, model-serving ports, database ports, broker ports, and VIOS/VST APIs unavailable to untrusted networks.

  • Allow Docker bridge or private-subnet traffic needed for VSS services to call each other. If healthy containers cannot reach host services from a Docker bridge network, see Bridge-network container cannot reach a VSS service on the host.